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Life Support and Habitation and Planetary Protection Workshop 
Final Report 
 
A workshop entitled “Life Support and Habitation and Planetary Protection Workshop” was 
held in Houston, Texas on April 27-29, 2005 at the Center for Advanced Space Studies. The 
primary objective of the workshop was to facilitate the development of planetary protection 
guidelines for future human Mars exploration missions and to identify the potential effects of 
these guidelines on the design and selection of related human life support, extravehicular 
activity and monitoring and control systems. These specific topics were identified as needing 
further characterization during a previous workshop that broadly examined the need for 
planetary protection regulations for Mars human exploration missions (see NASA/CP – 
2005-213461, 2005).    
 
The concept of planetary protection was formally established in Article IX of the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (UN, 
1967). Planetary Protection (PP) is the term given to the practice of protecting solar system 
bodies (i.e., planets, moons, comets, and asteroids) from contamination by Earth life, and 
protecting Earth from possible life forms that may be returned from other solar system 
bodies. PP is essential for several important reasons: to preserve our ability to study other 
worlds as they exist in their natural states; to avoid contamination that would obscure our 
ability to find life elsewhere—if it exists; and to ensure that we take prudent precautions to 
protect Earth's biosphere in case it does. NASA’s Planetary Protection Office is responsible 
for the implementation of, and compliance with, appropriate PP policy for all US missions. 
In particular, NASA's Planetary Protection Officer is responsible for establishing detailed 
implementation requirements for specific mission types, depending on their potential impacts 
on specific celestial target bodies. While PP requirements for robotic missions exist, similar 
requirements for human missions to Mars have not yet been established. A major intent of 
this workshop was therefore to enable a coordinated and systematic means to assist the PP 
requirements generation process. 
  
This workshop was sponsored by the former Life Support and Habitation (LSH) program, 
(the functions of which have now been incorporated into the Advanced Capabilities Division) 
in order to understand the potential influence of future PP policies on activities in the 
Advanced Life Support (ALS), Advanced Extravehicular Activity (AEVA) and Advanced 
Environmental Monitoring and Control (AEMC) programs. The ALS Program (now replaced 
by the Exploration Life Support (ELS) Program) provides life support technologies to 
support extended human presence in space. ALS systems are designed to significantly 
decrease life-cycle costs, reduce mass, volume, power and energy needs, improve operational 
performance, increase mass closure, and promote self-sufficiency. ALS technologies are 
designed to support the essential functions that sustain life including: controlling cabin 
pressure, temperature and humidity; decrease the need for supplied resources by regenerating 
air and water for safe use by humans; managing wastes; and supplying food, potentially from 
higher plant production. The AEMC Program is charged with providing mature, proven 
environmental testing technologies and control strategies to monitor the physical, chemical 
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and microbial environment of both the human compartments and the life support systems of 
current and future spacecraft environments and extravehicular activity. The AEVA Program 
is responsible for developing systems that provide reliable and safe mobile human life 
support, particularly suits and rovers for human extravehicular activity. The systems must be 
capable of providing thermal, atmospheric and humidity control and protection from the 
external environment.  
 
Specialists from government, private industry and academia participated in the workshop. A 
plenary session was provided during the morning of the first day that addressed various areas 
of the workshop focus, namely PP, ALS, AEVA, and AEMC. For additional background, 
presentations were also given regarding robotic and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) 
activities. In the afternoon, the participants were divided into two parallel groups to initiate 
discussion on designated workshop topics as well as to identify other areas for further 
discussion. Group summary presentations were delivered on the morning of the second day. 
The participants were then divided into four specialized sub-groups to address the charges 
that were customized for each sub-group. The sub-groups consisted of PP, ALS, AEVA, and 
AEMC. On the morning of the third day, each sub-group presented their findings to the 
overall group, with ensuing discussion. Overall group findings were recorded and are 
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1    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This workshop was designed to bring representatives of the Life Support and Habitation 
(LSH) Division from the Advanced Life Support (ALS), Advanced Extravehicular Activity 
(AEVA), and Advanced Environmental Monitoring and Control (AEMC) Programs together 
with experts from NASA’s Planetary Protection (PP) Office to identify and discuss the 
interfaces between the LSH activities and PP policy generation and implementation. The 
workshop was structured to create an open exchange of information between all parties to 
promote an integrated understanding of the numerous areas involved, and to identify research 
and technology development (R&TD) and requirements generation needs.   
The workshop participants were first given preliminary presentations in the related topic 
areas and then divided into two general breakout groups that served to initiate analysis of 
issues and familiarize participants with the various fields of expertise represented.  
Subsequently, participants were divided into four specialized breakout groups (ALS, AEVA, 
AEMC and PP) to address assigned topics specific to those disciplines. A central tenant of 
the workshop was that PP policies for human missions consist of three main foci: 1) Avoid 
forward contamination of Mars or interference with scientific exploration from terrestrially-
associated microbial contaminants; 2) protect astronauts from harmful contamination from 
martian life forms; and 3) control back contamination from the spacecraft, astronauts and 
materials that are returned to Earth. To facilitate discussion, starting assumptions were 
drafted prior to the workshop, and were supplemented by participants during workshop 
deliberations. Key concepts and assumptions included: 
 
• Like robotic missions, human missions will need to take a conservative approach and 
assume that martian life exists until proven otherwise.  
• No human habitat or EVA system can be fully closed. Therefore missions carrying 
humans to Mars will inevitably contaminate the planet to some degree with terrestrial 
organisms and materials.   
• The increased capabilities that human explorers can contribute to the astrobiological 
exploration of Mars (as opposed to robotic missions) will be greatly reduced if human-
associated contamination is not controlled and understood. It is therefore essential to 
identify, characterize, minimize, and control contamination sources and pathways. It will 
be critical that every attempt be made to obtain evidence of past and/or present life on 
Mars well before human missions occur (NRC, 1992, 2005).  
• Safeguarding the Earth from potential back contamination is the highest planetary 
protection priority in Mars exploration. 
• Crew and hardware on Mars will inevitably be exposed to martian materials.  To the 
maximum extent practicable, these exposures should be understood and controlled.  
• To decrease the potential for back contamination and reduce mission costs, it is desirable 
to leave wastes and other contaminated materials on Mars upon mission completion.  
• Principal mitigation techniques include physical control over release (e.g., containment), 
possibly in conjunction with active processing (e.g., sterilization) and/or passive exposure 
to martian adverse surface conditions to destroy life and biosignatures. 
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• Deliberations are to be focused primarily on initial human Mars exploration missions. PP 
issues associated with pre-delivered cargo and systems are not major considerations for 
this workshop.  
The breakout groups identified relevant sources and pathways for both forward and back 
contamination. Significant amounts of wastes will originate from human life support and 
mobility systems (ALS and AEVA) that can be classified as forward contamination in both 
PP and scientific terms. All materials from the martian environment are considered to be 
potential sources of back contamination (e.g., soil, airborne particulates). Forward and back 
contamination pathways include: leakage from habitat, airlocks and other vessels; 
egress/ingress of humans, materials and equipment; EVA operations; surface storage/disposal 
of wastes; gas venting (nominal and contingency); and thermal systems leakage. 
Unintentional discharges may occur via events such as equipment failures, micrometeorite 
impacts, and rapid depressurization events. Breakout groups then identified potential 
mitigation approaches, and current technology capabilities and needs. It was suggested to 
preliminarily adopt conservative (more stringent) requirements to ensure that needed 
capabilities are available to meet mission schedule.  
There was general consensus among the participants regarding the need to establish 
requirements for both PP and scientific investigations early in the development cycle, as they 
significantly affect system design, technology trade options, development costs and possibly 
mission architecture. Of particular concern were the areas of discharge and disposal limits, 
backward contamination limits, and ISRU. It will be necessary to identify and define what 
will be regarded as contaminants by both PP and science communities. In addition, there is a 
clear need to develop a classification system of zones of biological, scientific, contamination 
and operational importance prior to and during human missions.  Finally, data on protocols 
and systems used for quarantine of crew and hardware upon Earth return were identified as 
significant system drivers.  
 
It was concluded, however, that it is currently impractical to provide quantitative PP 
guidelines, as PP requirements will evolve in the coming years in response to numerous 
factors (e.g., rapid changes in scientific information about Mars from robotic missions). 
Instead, a tentative conceptual approach consistent with current PP requirements was 
proposed to preliminarily guide the assessment of AEVA, ALS, AEMC and other aspects of 
human missions. The approach asserts that human missions to Mars shall not affect or 
otherwise contaminate “special regions” of Mars1, primarily through the use of cleaning 
operations and prudent landing site selection. It was also proposed that calculations based on 
this approach will determine the tolerable levels of contamination allowed for specific 
aspects of any particular human mission. Specific details of the approach are to be 
determined, but will involve close collaboration with the scientific community, and the 
evaluation of unavoidable levels of human-associated contaminants and their implications.  
 
                                                 
1 “Special Regions” as currently defined in the COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy of October 2002 include 
regions within which terrestrial organisms are likely to propagate, or are interpreted to have a high potential for 
the existence of extant martian life forms.  Currently applied to regions where liquid water is present or may 
occur.  
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To facilitate the process of developing a quantitative set of PP requirements, the ALS 
community addressed the need to further define initial material inventory, process products 
and by-products, release mechanisms associated with forward contamination, and the need to 
incorporate back contamination into system design. Likewise, the potential physical 
(chemical or biological) impacts that identified AEVA suit/portable life support system 
(PLSS) vent/leakage constituents would have in regard to forward contamination need to be 
characterized. Methods to assess the potential for forward and back contamination include 
physical testing, simulation and analysis. The AEMC sub-group focused on the need for 
detection standards, response time, and the difficult challenges of identifying organisms that 
represent back contamination.  
 
Finally, it was noted that long duration lunar operations can provide a relevant test-bed for 
many mission technologies. Mission planners should address PP technology on the Moon in 
ways that feed forward to martian exploration, even though the actual PP levels required on 
the Moon are considerably less stringent than those anticipated for Mars. Current concerns 
about biological potential and life detection on Mars suggest that technologies and operations 
related to PP are likely to need special attention.  In planning the long term design and 
operations strategies, it will be important to avoid pursuing two distinct and expensive 
technology pathways—one for the Moon and the other for Mars. 
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2   RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
2.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The establishment of requirements for the future human Mars exploration missions is a 
highly complex and integrated process that requires coordination of numerous fields of 
mission planning and technology development. Because of the increased potential for past or 
present life on Mars as opposed the Moon, and the potential for cross-contamination to harm 
both martian ecosystems (if present) and the Earth’s biosphere, PP policies are expected to be 
more stringent than those employed in initial Apollo landing missions. Establishment of 
these PP requirements will not occur in isolation; instead it will require interaction with those 
areas that it regulates. ALS, AEVA and AEMC are R&TD programs that have been 
identified as major interfacing areas that require increased collaboration in this process. In 
particular, knowledge will be required of the potential contaminant generation and pathways, 
and the mitigation capabilities of existing and future hardware systems. Of principal concern 
are overall leakage, material discharge and disposal, required monitoring systems and limits, 
controlling back contamination, quarantine procedures and identifying methods for 
unplanned contamination events.   
 
Summaries of the salient conclusions and recommendations of each program area are 
presented below. Detailed findings and recommendations of each specialized breakout group 
can be found in Section 6 of this report.    
 
2.2   ADVANCED LIFE SUPPORT  
 
The ALS Program develops hardware and systems that support humans in space, while trying 
to significantly minimize launch and life-cycle costs, improve performance, and minimize or 
eliminate the need for resupply for long-duration missions. A broad array of internal and 
external requirements is levied upon ALS systems. PP (external) requirements have the 
potential to significantly affect ALS system research and technology development. 
Requirements derived from scientific life detection programs on uses and releases of 
hydrocarbons or other chemical/materials may exert an equal or stronger impact. Overall, 
these requirements affect technology trade options and development costs.  Development of 
PP and scientific requirements for human missions should be accelerated, especially in the 
areas of discharge and disposal limits, backward contamination limits, and ISRU, to facilitate 
R&TD selection and implementation. Employing best estimates of available PP, scientific 
and ALS requirements can be used to preliminarily guide ALS technology development. 
Employing conservative (stricter) requirements should be considered, as it yields 
technologies that possess increased functionality and mission applicability. 
 
To support the development of PP and science requirements, the ALS community needs to 
identify their potential for forward contamination via further definition of initial material 
inventory, process products and release mechanisms. Likewise, it is necessary to identify 
critical ALS technology and requirements gaps. This can be facilitated by performing 
analyses of mission scenarios using various ALS technology suites to comply with predicted 
requirements early in the development process. It is imperative to maintain open 
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communication between the PP, scientific, AEVA, AEMC, ALS and other communities 
regarding advances in knowledge related to PP requirements and concerns. These systems 
operate in an integrated fashion, and require coordination for mission success. 
 
2.3   ADVANCED EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY  
 
The AEVA community is in need of realistic PP guidelines and requirements that are; a) 
tolerant of EVA hardware systems design feasibility limitations, b) have technical 
practicality, c) have minimum impact to mission planning and operations, d) have an 
architecture so as not to affect human functional performance capabilities, and e) are 
acceptable to both the PP and science communities.  These guidelines and requirements will 
drive costs; the only way to reasonably mitigate these costs is to identify these guidelines and 
requirements early in the development cycle.   
 
In general, the AEVA community has identified the gaseous constituents that vent from 
extravehicular mobility units (EMUs), but does not presently know what level of biological 
material is released during the course of normal operations. The AEVA community  therefore 
recommends conducting human space suit chamber tests to determine biological and 
chemical signature characterizations generated by space suit system venting and leakage 
effluents using sample tracer elements or markers.  
 
The PP community needs to develop a system of classification for Mars surface sites based 
on the level of scientific and other interests that will define “zones of operation”, perhaps 
ranging from “no human contact” to “unlimited contact”.  Lastly, the PP community needs to 
empirically identify and determine what level of microbial spore density and 
chemical/organic constituents are allowable for EVA surface operations. 
 
2.4   ADVANCED MONITORING AND CONTROL 
 
The AEMC Program is responsible for developing methods and sensors to support a variety 
of measurement needs, and complementary process control systems. With respect to 
specifically supporting PP and science-based requirements, numerous needs were identified. 
Overall, increased capability is needed for the detection of forward contaminants via a more 
accurate microbial burden analysis. Current PP assay methods include only culturable 
bacterial spores, and do not identify viruses, prions, and eukaryotic cells. It was 
recommended that the monitoring capability for forward contamination be equal to or better 
than the current specification for a Category IVa non-life detection mission (NASA, NPR 
8020.12C).  
 
It was determined that biological and organic contaminant baseline levels will need to be 
identified regarding contamination resulting from the habitats, EVA suits and rovers, and 
surface operations. This requires the characterization of ALS and AEVA as contaminant 
sources. Requirements development for PP and life-detection sciences needs to be 
coordinated with AEMC and performed early in the development cycle. Of notable mention 
are the needs for both forward and back-contamination detection targets and levels, needed 
system response time, and required mitigation technologies.  
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2.5    PLANETARY PROTECTION   
 
Although there is an absence of explicit PP policies and requirements for human missions to 
Mars at present, it is possible to outline a conceptual approach for both forward and back 
contamination controls that center on protection of special regions. This approach can 
provide preliminary guidelines for planners and designers of AEVA, ALS, and AEMC 
activities. Refinement of the approach and development of more specific guidelines will 
likely occur over time in response to information from R&D activities coupled with findings 
from the precursor robotic missions outlined in the Exploration Roadmap (refer to Figure 2 in 
Section 6.4.7).  
 
PP requirements for human missions will undoubtedly be very different than those used 
during Apollo missions. Clearly, early and regular coordination between the PP, scientific, 
planning, engineering, operations and medical communities is needed to develop workable 
and effective designs for human operations on Mars. Coordination will bring numerous 
mutual advantages to the various programs such as identifying common needs for new 
technologies (e.g., among planetary science exploration, human mission operations, and PP).  
 
Finally, long duration operations on the Moon may provide a relevant test-bed for many 
mission technologies. Mission planners must address PP technology on the Moon in ways 
that feed forward to martian exploration, even though the actual PP levels required on the 
Moon are considerably less stringent than those for Mars. Current concerns about biological 
potential and life detection on Mars suggest that technologies and operations related to PP are 
likely to need special attention. In planning the long term design and operations strategies, it 
will be important to avoid going down two distinct and expensive technology pathways—one 
for the Moon and the other for Mars.  
 6
3.  INTRODUCTION  
 
3.1    MOTIVATION FOR THE WORKSHOP 
 
As evidenced by both previous human lunar and Mars surface robotic missions, it is expected 
that PP guidelines will serve as a strong driver in the design and operation of human Mars 
exploration missions. In addition, scientific objectives such as the search for extraterrestrial 
life may also affect mission design. It is therefore necessary to promptly establish martian PP 
guidelines for human missions to facilitate the timely and economical design of compliant 
spacecraft and habitation systems.  
 
This requires a thorough knowledge of potential forward and back contamination pathways 
and characteristics, and a current understanding of the biological potential of Mars. While 
numerous considerations are involved in PP policy development, key program areas that 
require investigation include: the Advanced Life Support (ALS) program, which is 
responsible for managing air, water and solid wastes, and providing food and thermal 
control; and Advanced Extra-Vehicular Activity (AEVA), which could result in forward and 
back contamination primarily via human and equipment ingress/egress operations. 
Additionally, the Advanced Monitoring and Environmental Control (AEMC) program will 
be responsible for developing methods that facilitate the monitoring of contaminants relevant 
to established PP and scientific guidelines. 
 
This workshop was created to bring together representatives from ALS, AEVA, AEMC and 
PP communities to identify and address significant open design and operation issues 
regarding PP and the human exploration of Mars, and to initiate the generation of preliminary 
PP guidelines to facilitate system development. 
 
3.2    CHARTER TO THE WORKSHOP   
 
The establishment of system requirements is an urgent need for the ALS, AEVA and AEMC 
programs. This workshop was therefore designed to identify and systematically address the 
process of requirements generation with respect to PP concerns in relation to these programs. 
In this vein, workshop participants were charged to address the following top-level workshop 
objectives: 
 
1) Initiate communication, understanding, and a working relationship between the ALS, 
AEVA, AEMC and PP communities regarding the effect of PP policy development and 
implementation requirements for future human missions. 
 
2) Define top-level PP concerns and issues associated with both forward and back 
contamination, and determine their likely effects on ALS, AEVA and AEMC hardware and 
operations for the first human mission to Mars.  
  
3) Identify PP requirements that will be needed to guide future technology development for 
ALS, AEVA and AEMC systems in advance of the first human mission.  
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4) Examine management approaches that may be used to reduce the risk of developing ALS, 
AEVA and AEMC systems prior to full definition of PP policies.  
  
5) Identify important research areas and identify any gaps in science or technology capability 
that will help guide the development of technologies and approaches for ALS, AEVA, and 
AEMC consistent with PP concerns regarding both forward and back contamination.   
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4    WORKSHOP PLANNING    
 
4.1 WORKSHOP PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRE-WORKSHOP    
DOCUMENTS 
 
The organizing committee consisted of representatives from the Advanced Life Support 
Program, NASA Headquarters, SETI Institute and the Planetary Protection Office. Numerous 
teleconferences were conducted among the committee members prior to the workshop to 
develop the purpose and scope of the workshop, and produce the background readings for 
participants. Additionally, various workshop participants conducted telecons to generate a 
preliminary set of Workshop Assumptions to provide a well defined starting point for 
deliberations. Additional assumptions were generated during the workshop.   
 
To better prepare the participants for performing workshop tasks, several documents were 
compiled and given to the participants as reading material prior to the workshop. The 
documents are listed below.   
 
• Draft Working Copy of: Life Support and Habitation and Planetary Protection 
Workshop Assumptions (See Section 5.3.1 for the actual assumption list and 
accompanying participant comments) 
 
• Summary of:  Safe on Mars: Precursor Measurements Necessary to Support Human 
Operations on the Martian Surface. NRC Committee on Precursor Measurements 
Necessary to Support Human Operation on the Surface of Mars, National Academy 
Press, Washington DC, 2002 
 
• Summary of: Planetary Protection Issues in the Human Exploration of Mars 
(Summarized) Race, M.S., M.E. Criswell, and J.D. Rummel, 2003.  (Paper no. 2003-
01-2523. International Conference on Environmental Systems (ICES), Vancouver, B.C. 
July 2003) 
 
• Summary of: Influence of Planetary Protection Guidelines on Waste Management 
Operations. J.A. Hogan, J.W. Fisher, J.A. Levri, M.S. Race, K. Wignarajah, P. 
Stabekis. International Conference on Environmental Systems (ICES), Rome, Italy. 
July 2005, Paper no. 2005-01-3097. 
 
Additionally, relevant programmatic websites were given to allow participants to seek 
additional information. These website are listed below:   
Life Support and Habitation: http://lsh.jsc.nasa.gov/
Life Support and Habitation Overview Presentation: 
http://www.dsls.usra.edu/meetings/bio2005/pdf/Walzpresentation.pdf
Planetary Protection:  http://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/pp/documents/index.htm
Advanced Life Support: http://advlifesupport.jsc.nasa.gov/
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Advanced Monitoring and Environmental Control: http://aemc.jpl.nasa.gov/
Advanced Extravehicular Activity: http://ctsd.jsc.nasa.gov/ec5/advanced.html
4.2    PARTICIPANTS 
 
Participants were selected to assemble a diverse set of programmatic managers, biological 
and physico-chemical researchers, systems analysts, engineers and technology developers 
from Planetary Protection, Advanced Life Support, Advanced Extravehicular Activity, 
Advanced Environmental Monitoring and Control, In-Situ Resource Utilization and Robotics 
programs. Participants from federal government, private companies and academia were 
invited. A major intent was to assemble a broad array of expertise that promoted both a top-
down and bottom-up examination of the various topics. It was a major goal of this workshop 
to initiate communication and create long-standing collaborative relationships between 
necessary personnel. Refer to Appendix B for the full list of participants  
 
4.3   WORKSHOP STRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS  
 
4.3.1   Invited Speakers 
 
The workshop was initiated with a series of speakers that addressed the specific issues of 
their respective program areas. The speakers presented tutorials that served to educate the 
general audience regarding the various facets of ALS, AEVA, AEMC and PP and their 
potential interfaces. Presenters were briefed prior to the workshop as to the general topic 
areas to address.  Invited talks are listed below.  
 
• Advanced Life Support – Dr. Daniel J. Barta, NASA Johnson Space Center 
• Advanced Extravehicular Activity – Dr. Lara Kearney, NASA Johnson Space 
Center 
• Advanced Environmental Monitoring and Control – Dr. Darrell Jan, Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory 
• Planetary Protection and its Development – Dr. John D. Rummel, NASA 
Headquarters 
• Planetary Protection Implementation on Robotic Missions – Dr. Karen Buxbaum 
and Dr. Jack Barengoltz, Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
• Planetary Protection and Humans on Mars – Report of the First Workshop – Dr. 
Margaret S. Race, SETI Institute 
 
4.3.2   Breakout Groups 
 
After the presentations, workshop participants were divided into two parallel General 
Breakout Groups that separately addressed pre-determined topics. They likewise identified 
and discussed other issues regarding overall ALS, AEVA, AEMC and PP concerns. The 
purpose of the General Breakout Groups was to provide an open forum where all participants 
could discuss issues within the various fields of expertise, thereby preparing themselves for 
more specific tasks associated with the Specialized Breakout Groups. Two separate 
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presentations were then delivered to all participants that conveyed the group findings, 
followed by a general discussion.  
 
The participants were then separated into Specialized Breakout Groups to further elaborate 
on assigned topics and generate a final presentation that summarized the issues within their 
breakout focus. The Specialized Breakout Groups consisted of ALS, AEVA and AEMC, and 
PP. Each Specialized Breakout Group prepared a presentation that was presented in a plenary 
session on the morning of Day 3. These presentations were followed by a general discussion 
and workshop conclusions.  
 
A set of pre-determined topics and questions for the two general and four specialized 
breakout groups were developed and reviewed prior to the workshop. These were compiled 
into electronic presentation format to facilitate the generation of both summary presentations 
and the information required for the final report. Specialized Break-out Group leaders were 
responsible for summarizing the groups’ findings, and preparing their sections for the final 
report. The assignments and discussions topics for the various breakout groups are 
summarized below:   
 
The purpose of the two General Breakout Groups was to provide a means to allow 
participants to openly converse within a group that contained expertise from all the workshop 
focus areas. Having two separate groups allowed for separate approaches to be pursued, and 
provided a manageable group size. The charge to the General Breakout Groups was to focus 
on top-level PP concerns and issues likely to impact various specific systems for human 
missions to Mars. 
 
The ALS Specialized Breakout Group was required to identify issues that could interface 
with PP within the seven program elements, namely: Waste Management, Water Recovery, 
Air Recovery, Food Systems, Thermal Control, Biomass Production and System Integration 
Modeling and Analysis.  
 
The AEVA Specialized Breakout Group was responsible for examining the influences of 
PP issues on the task of providing humans with portable life support systems and vehicular 
mobility. 
 
The primary task of the AEMC Specialized Breakout Group was to identify and address 
the monitoring and control needs of human missions to Mars in relation to potential PP 
regulations. 
 
The PP Specialized Breakout Group differed from the groups in that a primary function of 
deliberations was to devise a preliminary approach capable of guiding ALS, AEVA and 
AEMC programs regarding system development in relation to PP regulations, as well as to 






4.3.3   Workshop Assumptions  
 
A set of working assumptions was developed prior to the workshop in order to give 
participants well defined boundaries on the topics of consideration. These assumptions are 
listed below.   
 
1. Human Mars missions will necessarily generate materials originating from both biotic and 
abiotic sources that could potentially contaminate Mars and/or be classified as an indicator 
of life. 
 
2. The first human mission to Mars is not likely to occur before ~2030, and extensive data 
and information from precursor robotic science missions will help guide the selection of the 
landing site and will provide sufficient knowledge about martian environmental materials to 
support appropriate design of human missions and systems. 
 
3. Multiple Mars human exploration mission architectures may be utilized, including  an on-
orbit (non-landing) mission and short and/or extended duration surface stays (e.g., 30 to 
>600 days).  
 
4. Multiple human missions to the Mars surface may occur over the course of years, either to 
a common landing site or to multiple landing sites.  If to a common site, the common site 
habitat may be reoccupied, and operate at a TBD level during periods between crew stays. 
 
5. A split mission strategy may deploy some mission assets at Mars prior to the launch or 
landing of the crew.  Thus, prior to the arrival of humans on Mars, precursor robotic 
missions may have delivered and cached cargo and materials including essential hardware 
and supplies for establishing the first base camp.  
 
6. There may be autonomous deployment of critical surface system elements prior to human 
arrival, potentially including: science equipment, habitat, unfueled ascent vehicle, and ISRU 
fuel production, power, thermal control, navigation, communication and transit/mobility 
systems.   
 
7.  Any hardware or materials delivered to Mars by precursor robotic missions are presumed 
to have complied with the appropriate forward contamination controls prior to arrival. This 
workshop will focus only on the Planetary Protection (PP) impacts of the materials or 
hardware during their use in operations and activities associated with human missions.  
 
8. The autonomous deployment of surface system elements prior to human arrival may 
generate materials that have PP concerns (e.g., associated with construction, excavation, 
trenching, road building, installation of navigation and communication systems, breathing 
gas, water, etc.). 
 
9. The design of human and equipment ingress/egress protocols and associated 
infrastructure will be established to control human contact with the martian environment.  
This includes the handling of both reusable and expendable (waste) materials.  
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10.  Planetary protection concerns for a human mission will have three foci (as outlined in 
the Pingree Park report (Race et al. 2003):  a) avoid forward contamination of Mars or 
interference with scientific exploration from terrestrially-associated microbial contaminants; 
b) protect astronauts from cross contamination or contact with martian materials, whether 
inside or outside the habitat; and c) break  the contact chain with Mars and  avoid or 
minimize  back contamination from the spacecraft, astronauts and materials returned to 
Earth. 
 
11.  Human Mars surface missions will likely involve human exploration and operations 
outside of the habitat vessel, requiring human egress/ingress. Extravehicular activity (EVA) 
may range from local to extensive excursions. The crew will likely utilize personal EVA suits, 
and may be aided by motorized rovers.  
 
12.  High cost penalties associated with the propulsion of large amounts of waste materials, 
along with crew health and safety, are strong incentives to allow waste materials to remain 
on Mars after mission completion. For similar reasons, controlled jettisoning of transit 
segment wastes into interplanetary space may also be desirable.  
 
13. Materials that are jettisoned to space or remain on Mars after mission completion must 
be managed to avoid forward and back contamination as prescribed by Planetary Protection 
guidelines (to be established).  
 
14. No assumptions are made at this time about quarantine requirements or facilities (or 
health stabilization facilities and requirements) upon return from Mars. 
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5   COMBINED REPORT OF GENERAL BREAKOUT GROUPS  
 
5.1   GENERAL BREAKOUT GROUP PARTICIPANTS 
 
General Breakout Group 1  
LSH Lead: Mark Kliss                                         
PP Lead: Margaret Race  
 
Group Members: 




Louise Hamlin  
Anthony Hanford  
John Hogan   
Joseph Kosmo   
Michael Lawson  
Aaron Mills   
Richard Sauer 
Laurent Sibille  
Frederick Smith  




General Breakout Group 2 
LSH Lead: Dan Barta ALS  
PP Lead: Perry Stabekis 
 
Group Members: 
Judy Allton  
Jack Barengoltz   
Joe Chambliss  
Sharon Cobb  
Alan Drysdale  
Dean Eppler 
John Fisher  
Darrell Jan  
Charlie (Mark) Ott  
Alan Perka  
John Rummel 
 
5.2   CHARGE TO GENERAL BREAKOUT GROUPS (CHARGE APPLIES TO 
BOTH GROUPS) 
 
Pivotal Focus:  
Focusing on both forward and back contamination, define the top-level PP concerns and 
issues that are likely to impact specific systems for human missions to Mars.  
 
Possible specific issues for inquiry: 
• Initiate general discussion using the Specific Questions List (see section 5.3.2) to 
promote interchange between the various fields of expertise.  
• Identify potential forward and back contaminants, pathways and interfaces for ALS 
and AEVA systems and relevant AEMC monitoring needs. 
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• Identify PP requirements/issues that require further definition.  
• Identify gaps and prioritize discussion topics and issues listed in the Specialized 
Breakout Group tasks. 
 
5.3   GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Having two separate groups allowed for separate approaches to be pursued, and provided 
a manageable group size. Because there was significant overlap between the responses of 
the two groups, the following is a unified summary (with minimal editing) of the findings 
from both General Groups. Topics that are captured in greater detail in the Specialized 
Group reports are deemphasized here. 
 
5.3.1   Review and Discussion of Workshop Assumptions  
 
Task: Workshop participants were provided set of 14 initial assumptions to assist in 
guiding deliberations. Participants found it helpful to address each assumption and 
provide comments for possible revisions and additions. The initial assumptions are 
numbered and in bold italics, followed by group comments (when presented): 
 
1. Human Mars missions will necessarily generate materials originating from both 
biotic and abiotic sources that could potentially contaminate Mars and/or be classified 
as an indicator of life. 
 
Even with the best of designs, no habitation system will be fully closed, even if only 
because of unavoidable leakage of gases. Numerous potential pathways were identified 
for both forward and back contamination (e.g., ingress/egress and EVA operations), 
indicating that forward and habitat contamination will occur. Dustlocks for crew and 
material transfer were proposed as a potential means to control back contamination.  
 
Initially, forward contaminants will be of local concern, but global and long-term scales 
need to be considered. There will likely be different time and distribution scales for 
different contaminants. Wind is probably the most prominent mechanism for spreading 
contaminants both in the short and long-term. Subsurface aquifer transport or dispersion 
is less understood, and should be further examined due to the potential for microbial 
proliferation and persistence.  
 
The materials used in ALS and other systems need to be identified and monitored (e.g., 
organic inventory). It is advisable to avoid generation of undesirable by-products or 
wastes through design and advanced planning. While it was felt that non-condensible 
gases could likely be vented to martian environment, provided they are filtered to capture 
viable organisms, further research on gas venting is recommended. It is assumed that 
contamination controls will be levied on the mission, but it’s uncertain how forward 
contamination controls would apply to the inside of a spacecraft on human missions; 
mitigation appears to be the only practical approach. It was also recommended that 
martian dust undergo thorough characterization in advance of human missions to 
understand its potential for back contamination and general nuisance properties.  
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Definition is required as to what will be considered a contaminant, for both PP and life 
detection science. Likewise, limits needed for detection will aid in the establishment of 
release levels. Because of the potential challenges in identifying putative martian life, it 
was proposed that martian dust could serve as a surrogate for back contamination 
monitoring.  
 
2. The first human mission to Mars is not likely to occur before ~2030, and extensive 
data and information from precursor robotic science missions will help guide the 
selection of the landing site and will provide sufficient knowledge about martian 
environmental materials to support appropriate design of human missions and systems.  
 
Robotic missions may help guide the missions, but will not fully retire all the risks. The 
current robotic program will provide important information, but preliminary design 
decisions will need to be made before all necessary information is available. This reveals 
the challenges of planning in the face of uncertainty. 
 
The phrase “sufficient knowledge” suggests that enough information will be provided for 
the “appropriate design.” It is recommended that the word “sufficient” be deleted and that 
discussions be conducted during this workshop to define requirements for precursor 
missions.  The Mars Exploration Program Assessment Group (MEPAG) may be 
addressing both PP and Science questions. 
 
3. Multiple Mars human exploration mission architectures may be utilized, including  
an on-orbit (non-landing) mission and short and/or extended duration surface stays 
(e.g., 30 to >600 days).  
 
Orbiting non-landing spacecraft can be a PP concern if materials are released due to 
venting or other release failures, collision with meteoroid or debris or if it de-orbits. 
 
4. Multiple human missions to the Mars surface may occur over the course of years, 
either to a common landing site or to multiple landing sites.  If to a common site, the 
common site habitat may be reoccupied, and operate at a TBD level during periods 
between crew stays. 
 
5. A split mission strategy may deploy some mission assets at Mars prior to the launch 
or landing of the crew.  Thus, prior to the arrival of humans on Mars, precursor 
robotic missions may have delivered and cached cargo and materials including 
essential hardware and supplies for establishing the first base camp.  
 
Precursor un-manned spacecraft associated with human missions may deploy either on 
surface or in orbit (supplies, storage, return vehicles).  
 
6. There may be autonomous deployment of critical surface system elements prior to 
human arrival, potentially including: science equipment, habitat, unfueled ascent 
vehicle, and ISRU fuel production, power, thermal control, navigation, communication 
and transit/mobility systems.   
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It would be prudent to rephrase to include “ISRU production for fuel and life support”. 
 
7.  Any hardware or materials delivered to Mars by precursor robotic missions are 
presumed to have complied with the appropriate forward contamination controls prior 
to arrival. This workshop will focus only on the Planetary Protection (PP) impacts of 
the materials or hardware during their use in operations and activities associated with 
human missions.  
 
8. The autonomous deployment of surface system elements prior to human arrival may 
generate materials that have PP concerns (e.g., associated with construction, 
excavation, trenching, road building, installation of navigation and communication 
systems, breathing gas, water, etc.). 
 
9. The design of human and equipment ingress/egress protocols and associated 
infrastructure will be established to control human contact with the martian 
environment.  This includes the handling of both reusable and expendable (waste) 
materials.  
 
Participants agreed that some level of forward and back contamination will occur through 
egress/ingress operations. Therefore, there was strong recognition of the importance of 
developing a system of classifying zones of biological, scientific, contamination and 
operational importance prior to and during human surface missions. Like robotic 
missions, human missions will need to take a conservative approach and assume that 
martian life exists until proven otherwise. Additionally, it was agreed that leaving wastes 
and other contaminated materials on Mars after mission completion was an effective 
method of decreasing back contamination, provided that materials are appropriately 
managed.   
 
10.  Planetary protection concerns for a human mission will have three foci (as 
outlined in the Pingree Park report (Race et al. 2003) :  a) avoid forward 
contamination of Mars or interference with scientific exploration from terrestrially-
associated microbial contaminants; b) protect astronauts from cross contamination or 
contact with martian materials, whether inside or outside the habitat; and c) break  the 
contact chain with Mars and  avoid or minimize  back contamination from the 
spacecraft, astronauts and materials returned to Earth. 
 
11.  Human Mars surface missions will likely involve human exploration and 
operations outside of the habitat vessel, requiring human egress/ingress. 
Extravehicular activity (EVA) may range from local to extensive excursions. The crew 
will likely utilize personal EVA suits, and may be aided by motorized rovers.  
 
EVA suits are proven to be inherently leaky; at least 50 leakage pathways have been 
identified aside from the porosity of suit materials themselves. Forward and back 
contamination is foreseen as inevitable. The analogous approach of sealing electronic 
boxes with HEPA filters (an approach used for robotic missions) is not tenable for 
humans. Additionally, suits will need repair, maintenance and cleaning on a scheduled 
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basis. Methods need to be instituted to manage human exposure to martian dust. 
Likewise, microbial bioburden (i.e., microbial load) standards are required for EVA suits.   
 
12.  High cost penalties associated with the propulsion of large amounts of waste 
materials, along with crew health and safety, are strong incentives to allow waste 
materials to remain on Mars after mission completion. For similar reasons, controlled 
jettisoning of transit segment wastes into interplanetary space may also be desirable.  
 
There are three main mitigation approaches for risk management of wastes: 1) physical 
control over release (e.g., containment in canisters), 2) active destruction or 
transformation of the material (e.g., desiccation, oxidation, sterilization), and 3) passive 
use of adverse surface environments for sterilization or destruction of biosignatures. 
Existing technologies may not be adequate to support all Mars waste (solid, liquid, gases) 
management needs. The current approach for human spaceflight focuses on either store 
and return, or jettison.  
 
Currently, an explicit policy regarding waste jettison in deep space is lacking. While 
operationally it has been performed, further research is required. In general, it was felt 
that disposing waste materials in deep space may be considered as an acceptable option.  
Any wastes left on the surface must be contained at a TBD level, with special attention 
given to recycling, reuse or future reversibility on a TBD time scale. It is possible that 
this interim approach to the disposal of wastes may be sufficient to meet PP constraints.  
 
13. Materials that are jettisoned to space or remain on Mars after mission completion 
must be managed to avoid forward and back contamination as prescribed by Planetary 
Protection guidelines (to be established).  
 
Clarification is required to distinguish between “jettisoned” (suggesting a passive release 
that continues to travel with the spacecraft) and an “active jettison” which suggests a 
propulsion system associated with the release. Another method of jettison would involve 
a release prior to course correction. Further discussions are needed on whether a 
contained jettison is feasible when relying on atmospheric incineration in the martian 
atmosphere. If not, would this incineration be possible for liquid and gas release?  
Conventional wisdom indicates that breakup is related to speed, trajectory, size, type of 
material, etc.  Small particles may get to the surface with minimal heating.  The current 
PP specification for flash sterilization is 500oC for ½ second, for atmospheric entry 
(NASA, NPR 8020.12C).  However, additional research is clearly warranted regarding 
microbial survival and incineration (e.g., Nematodes on shuttle Columbia survived the re-
entry breakup). 
 
Questions of microbial survival and radiation will need further study as well. The UV 
radiation environment in orbit and at the surface may have a sterilizing effect. For small 
particles in the atmosphere, what contact time/dose may be adequate?  The NASA PP 
requirements and guidelines for robotic spacecraft (NASA, NPR 8020.12C) includes a 
specification concerning UV radiation exposure, but this regards transit.   There is no UV 
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lethality specification for Mars upper atmosphere that specifies the D value (the number 
of orders of magnitudes of kill). 
14. No assumptions are made at this time about quarantine requirements or facilities 
(or health stabilization facilities and requirements) upon return from Mars. 
 
This statement is ambiguous and unclear. If no assumptions are made, can the working 
group define the quarantine requirements and facilities? For most of the discussion, the 
group assumed the quarantine requirements and facilities would promote acceptable PP. 
Details about quarantine requirements are TBD and will necessarily involve medical and 
other experts.  
 
Suggested Additional Assumptions: 
The Moon would be utilized as a test bed to study Mars PP. 
 
What can be accomplished regarding using the Moon as a test bed is an open question, 
particularly since the PP requirements for Mars are stricter than for the Moon, where 
conditions are not conducive for microbial survival or life.  
 
We may not be able to discern between Earth life and Mars life. 
 
This is an extension to the discussions of assumptions 1 (Earth contamination confuses 
search for life on Mars) and 14 (sickness due to Earth-based human illness or infection 
from Mars organism).   
 
General Observation:  
Many of the assumptions are more applicable to longer duration missions, though the 
early Mars missions may be of shorter duration. The strategy of the working group was 
general and not duration dependent. 
 
5.3.2   Discussion of Specific Questions List  
 
A list of pre-determined questions was given to the participants in the two general 
breakout groups to ensure that key areas were discussed. (NOTE:  the responses below to 
these pre-determined questions reflect the participants’ discussions and are not 
intended to serve as formal recommendations.)  
 
Q1. Will interplanetary disposal during transit be allowed, and what conditions will be 
imposed? 
 
As mentioned in earlier comments (see assumptions), passive jettison will result in 
material staying with spacecraft and continuing to Mars. The use of a more active system 
or modifications to trajectory to enable passive jettison for disposal are possible, though 
either would increase costs. The use of any alternative must have no substantial risk 
toward the contamination of Mars. 
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Q2. Will any waste be allowed to be stored or disposed of on/below the surface if 
adequately contained? If so, what level of containment would be sufficient? What 
would be the necessary characteristics of the waste? How long will containment need 
to be assured? What level of certainty is required (e.g., <10-4)?  Does the state of the 
waste need to be rendered so as to preclude serving as a substrate for biological growth 
(i.e., mineralized)?  Will wastes be allowed to remain in the surface habitat after 
mission completion (or do they need to be contained on the surface or returned home)? 
 
If containment is adequate, waste can be stored on the surface of Mars.  Conditions or 
requirements including pressure constraints, venting options (including filter size and 
materials) will need to be defined. The acceptable release concentration could be defined 
by comparing it to current robotic mission requirements. If waste containers were stored 
below the surface, the container may have greater protection. In contrast, rupture of the 
container below ground may increase the potential for successful invasion of any existing 
martian ecosystems with terrestrial life. Processing to stabilize and/or sterilize wastes 
should be considered before the waste container is sealed. Additionally, the 
physical/chemical characteristics of the solid waste will have a direct effect on the life 
expectancy of the container. If habitats are not to be reused after a mission, they may be 
appropriate waste disposal sites, as it would offer another layer of protection. Likewise, 
they are easily located in case waste retrieval is necessary. 
 
Q3. Will there be constraints as to what will be allowed to be returned to Earth (i.e., 
potential for back-contamination)? The inside of the returning spacecraft may be 
contaminated to some degree from EVA interchange. This material will enter the solid, 
liquid and gas streams through various means.  Therefore, how do we return home? 
 
Yes, there will be constraints on material returned to Earth, so requirements are necessary 
to preclude contamination of the crew and habitat, especially in regard to EVA. Suits and 
tools should not enter the habitat, so a mechanism may need to be developed crew to 
safely remove suits before entering the habitat. In addition, an area may be necessary for 
suit maintenance (e.g., disposable suit “garage”).  The quarantine procedure and facility 
are undefined and directly affect this question.  The use of Earth-based models for 
quarantine, such as those developed by the Center for Disease Control (though they may 
not provide all necessary answers), may guide the development of cleaning procedures 
and isolation of returned samples (see, Rummel et al., 2002). For the crew as well as PP, 
external and internal contamination is an issue.  The goal of zero contaminants entering 
the vehicle (as initially advocated by the Pingree Park workshop – see Criswell et al., 
2005) is admirable, though impractical. Development of requirements will require 
additional detailed discussion including the limitation of ‘hitchhiker’ contamination and 
how this philosophy should be incorporated into the design of the vehicle/habitat. Areas 
included in the design/trade studies should include evaluation of cross-contamination 
after an EVA and docking activities with Earth return vehicles.  
 
Q4. Determine how internal habitat ALS technologies might affect the potential for 
planetary surface contamination (e.g., increased bioloads on suits and equipment, 
venting gases/liquids/particulates to planetary atmosphere via airlocks, etc.) 
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–  How "clean" do we need to be inside in order to support external PP requirements?  
Will the ALS Program be involved with cleaning issues, or will a different program 
be tasked with that? Will ALS need to handle cleaning by-products? 
– Are there special measures that should be taken to avoid the propagation of 
extraterrestrial organisms in ALS systems? For example, if waste is stored "as-is", 
the waste could serve as a growth medium (if contaminated). The same is true for 
biological processors for waste, water and air. 
– What extent of gas venting (from habitats) will be allowed?  What compounds will be 
allowed/excluded? Will particulate (microbial, organic, inorganic) control be 
necessary? 
 
Internal cabin materials can be released both through airlock or cabin leakage.  Therefore, 
internal cleanliness will affect the extent and character of this contamination.  As a first 
attempt, one suggestion was to make calculations by analysis and compare against 3 x 
105 spores, which is the current requirement for robotic missions. Vents should be HEPA 
filtered to remove microorganisms (see specifications in NPR 8020.12C).  The need to 
remove biosignature gases and other materials will be determined by life detection 
science constraints.  Data can be generated based on analysis and presented to scientists 
for review. Space craft material off-gassing is of concern on the outside of spacecraft, 
including seals and lubricants as possible sources. 
 
Further definition of terms is required to accurately answer some questions. In particular, 
is there a standard definition of a “biosignature”? Are all volatile organics considered 
biosignatures? The scientific community should be tasked to define this and other terms.  
It therefore may be acceptable to release Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), 
depending on definitions and scientific sensitivities. 
 
Operational measures for cleaning will clearly need to be developed. Existing hygiene 
procedures, such as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) analyses, may 
be first line of defense (aside from contamination prevention) and may be adequate. 
Contingency kits/protocols for common contingencies may need to be employed. 
 
Q5.  Determine similar restrictions and requirements to be placed on human 
extravehicular activity (EVA) systems 
 
EVA suits will likely have similar restrictions and requirements as habitats and other 
vehicles. Venting of gas may not be allowable if only treated with a HEPA filter.   
Requirements need to be established regarding allowable chemical/microbial leakage. 
 
Q6.  Determine restrictions and/or required procedures to be emplaced for human 
activities and systems for use outside the habitat, particularly with respect to: 
– Subsurface access 
– Use and/or distribution of fluids outside the habitat 
– Planned or unplanned biological experiments or releases 
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As the subsurface may be a suitable environment for microbial growth, this area can be 
considered a “hot spot” and potential cross-contamination requirements should be more 
stringent. Sub-surface access should be conducted using only sterile equipment, 
maintaining a clear separation between the operator and drilling equipment. Questions 
remain on how to define the interface/depth/definition between subsurface and surface 
environments. 
 
Most fluids that are used will need to be completely contained.  In the event a fluid is 
required outside of containment, such as for construction, the use of local water (Mars 
ice) is acceptable, though it should not be contaminated from terrestrial sources. Fluids 
for drilling would have to be sterile. Options for these fluids may include blown-in foams 
or two-part cements.  
 
Planned biological experiments would likely need several layers of containment. A list of 
biosignatures would be beneficial for design and implementation of the habitat. 
 
Q7. Determine what types of monitoring systems, procedures and equipment are 
necessary to assist in PP policy implementation and verification of compliance. This 
includes issues regarding contamination of the planetary surface, habitat 
contamination and return of spacecraft and samples to Earth.  
 
The characteristics of martian microorganisms, if they exist, are unknown. Therefore the 
closest analog would be to attempt to detect markers/organisms of terrestrial origin. As 
monitoring systems could possibly be used to detect both terrestrial and martian 
microorganisms/chemical agents, they should be located near the airlocks, around storage 
areas, and at sites located at selected distances away from habitat to detect propagation of 
contaminants. Additional monitoring units for dust could also be useful for the detection 
of potential back contamination. The crew must be adequately trained in PP and 
contamination control regardless of the type of monitoring equipment used. It was 
suggested that at least one of the crew members be trained and be responsible for PP 
compliance.  
 
For forward contamination, monitoring systems could be employed to detect leaks, but it 
is questionable whether this would be valuable. The use of biological sensors is worthy of 
examination. For backward contamination, the major challenge is the lack of knowledge 
of target contaminants. It is possible to utilize martian dust monitors to serve as a 
representation of the potential for back contamination. Experiments that challenge Earth 
organisms with simulated Mars environmental conditions should be conducted. 
 
5.3.3   Interface Identification 
 
General Groups were also asked to focus on both forward and back contamination 
to identify and discuss interfaces between ALS, AEVA, AEMC and PP and potential 




Participants were requested to perform the following tasks: 
• Initiate general discussion using the Specific Questions List to promote interchange 
between the various fields of expertise  
• Identify potential forward and back contaminants, pathways and interfaces for ALS 
and AEVA systems and relevant AEMC monitoring needs 
• Identify PP requirements/issues that require further definition  
 
General Findings: 
• ALS and AEVA are very similar systems and both will utilize AEMC for monitoring.   
• Common consumables and wastes are utilized for ALS and AEVA. Likewise, they 
may be transferred from common supplies and waste tanks.   
• Pressurized rovers are essentially mobile habitats, though it is anticipated they will 
have higher leakage rates. Rovers may be less constrained with respect to PP 
requirements as they will be left on Mars, and the crew may wear protective suits 
while inside. If both suits and rovers dock with the habitat, a higher level of 
cleanliness can be maintained. Further investigation is required regarding the 
development of docking systems for both suits and rovers. 
 
Other suggested topics for further discussions included the following: 
• Identification of implications of promising new technologies and approaches prior to 
first human mission. 
– If robotic missions suggest the absence of life, backward contamination issues 
may recede, but forward contamination may still remain an important issue. 
• Identification of R&D needs. 
– The development of a “dockable suit” with a non-contaminating airlock and 
suit don/doff (i.e., putting on/taking off) area. 
– Non-venting life support systems for both habitat and EVA (leakage may not 
be preventable).  
– Long-term waste containment and mineralization/processing; Subsurface vs. 
surface storage must be examined. 
– Waste disposal during transit (jettisoning; mineralization) should be 
considered. 
– Identify if the current list of ALS technology gaps may be relevant to PP. 
• Identification of anticipated problems for various scenarios or mission architectures. 
(e.g., What if life is discovered before human launch?)  
– Back contamination issues will be a major issue; possibly restricting future 
missions to robotic missions only. 
• Identification of contingency events. 
– Need to identify contingencies and fault tolerance relative to PP; this may 
become an exhaustive list.  For example, what are the implications of an 
accidental breach with ET material entering spacecraft; fires; cabin air venting 
to external environment; etc?    
• Unresolved issues or concerns for discussion at future workshops or meetings. 
– Identifying biosignatures – “signs of life”; what methods are available to 
develop comprehensive lists?  
 23
– Discrimination between Earth-induced and Mars-induced illnesses that result 
from biological entities (e.g., common cold vs. martian pathogen). 
– Analysis of what materials may be released during leakage. 
 
5.3.4   Gap Identification and Prioritization 
 
 The General Breakout Groups were also asked to identify knowledge/technology gaps 
and prioritize discussion topics and issues listed in the Specific Breakout Group Tasks.   
The list below indicates the questions/topics that were identified by the groups 
(underlined), followed by the group findings or comments.  
 
• Identify what information is to be gathered from precursor robotic missions. - This 
may already be underway by MEPAG (for both planetary science and PP). 
• Is a contained jettison feasible when relying on atmospheric incineration in Mars 
atmosphere? If not, would this incineration be possible for liquid and gas release?  - 
Discussion on this topic was held throughout the deliberations. 
• What quarantine requirements and facilities are required to adequately support PP? - 
Facilities for robotic spacecraft and samples have been discussed, but not for 
astronauts.  The return flight has been suggested as part of the quarantine, but this 
may not be adequate; medical facilities and tests in the spacecraft for evaluations will 
not be adequate.  A series of NASA-sponsored workshops on this topic should be 
identified. Consideration of required medical tests would be appropriate to be 
included during return flight.  This may be responsibility of NASA’s Chief Medical 
Officer.  
• Discussion on NPR 8020.12C Specifications (NASA’s current PP requirements for 
robotic missions) - Planetary Protection Policy and the Outer Space Treaty are for 
preserving integrity of science and not for ethical reasons. 
• Jettisoning of wastes and un-needed equipment - This is potentially a complex issue.  
Trajectory analysis must be performed to determine whether wastes will follow a path 
that won’t interfere with other planets, spacecraft, etc.   
• Definition of Biosignatures - The definition of biosignatures must be standardized.  
Likewise, biogenic organics (and inorganics) that must be controlled will need to be 
defined.  Organics, especially non-biogenics, that are acceptable for release must also 
be defined.  PP is mostly concerned with replicating microorganisms, and preserving 
science on future missions. PP does not have requirements for organics other than 
listing of measurements and archiving.  Further input is needed from the life detection 
scientific community. 
• Requirements for Waste System Technology Developers – Requirements and other 
information are needed regarding storage and containment, leakage relative to 
organics of concern, microbial content, amount of water in stored wastes or storage 
environments (e.g., subsurface), storage duration, and reliability of containment. 
• Use of ISRU - If the biohazards are currently indefinable, how will it be possible to 
certify process products (e.g., potable water)? This issue primarily regards prevention 
of back contamination. Additional investigation is required to determine the potential 
effects on specific Mars localities from which resources were extracted (forward 
contamination issue).   
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• Maps of Zones of Minimum Biological Risk – Mapping efforts are required to guide 
the influence of PP and science requirements, and necessary operations need to be to 
developed to achieve compliance. 
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6    REPORTS OF SPECIALIZED BREAKOUT GROUPS 
 
6.1   REPORT OF THE ADVANCED LIFE SUPPORT SPECIALIZED 
BREAKOUT GROUP 
 
6.1.1  Participants of Specialized Breakout Group 1 – Advanced Life Support   
 
Leads: John Hogan and John Fisher                        
 
Group Members: 
Daniel Barta  
Joe Chambliss 
Alan Drysdale  
Aaron Mills  
Frederick Smith 
 
6.1.2 Group Charge 
 
The ALS Specialized Breakout Group was required to identify issues that could interface 
with PP within the individual program elements, namely: Waste Management, Water 
Recovery, Air Recovery, Food Systems, Thermal Control, Biomass Production and 
System Integration Modeling and Analysis. The specific charges for the ALS group are 
listed below: 
 State major findings and assumptions about PP considerations, as you understood 
them, that will impact ALS R&TD rationale. 
 Identify critical open issues/uncertainties relative to PP that affect ALS R&TD 
(unknowns). 
 Identify potential contaminants and pathways for ALS systems with respect to 
forward and backward contamination. 
 Identify plausible mitigation alternatives and obstacles for pertinent missions. 
 Identify topics that require further research and technology development and discuss 
development strategies with uncertain PP requirements. 
 Identify PP requirements that impose the greatest mission/development costs. 
 Identify PP requirements/topics that require further definition. 
 Develop overall recommendations on planetary protection relative to ALS 
development. 
 
6.1.3   Background Information 
 
The Advanced Life Support (ALS) Program represents a suite of enabling capabilities 
necessary to support human exploration missions. Advanced regenerative life support 
systems, including air revitalization, water recovery, thermal control, solid waste 
management, advanced food technology and crop systems, are key capabilities needed to 
decrease the mass, energy and volume of future spacecraft. Key aspects will include 
“closing the loop” to recover usable mass, utilizing in situ resources, decreasing 
requirements for expendables, energy, volume, heat rejection and crew time, while 
 26
providing a high degree of reliability. Remote missions will require increased 
contingency response capabilities for prevention and recovery from events, such as fire 
and hardware failure, that may threaten mission success and crew safety. Spacecraft and 
surface habitats will need additional capabilities to accommodate new environments, 
longer periods of service, and unique mission operations. 
 
Development of human life support systems will be constrained by a wide variety of 
highly integrated technology drivers including: 
 
 Basic human life support requirements 
 Specific mission requirements (e.g., mission location and duration) 
 Manned systems integration standards 
 Volume, mass, heat rejection, power, crew time 
 Safety, reliability, maintainability, etc. 
 Psycho-social factors and crew preference 
 
Planetary Protection represents an additional set of requirements that life support system 
developers have generally not considered. Life support systems have substantial potential 
to contribute to both forward and back contamination of Mars.  In particular, supporting 
humans involves the transport of a large quantity of gases, liquids and solids to and from 
humans (i.e., a large organic inventory).  As materials are consumed, numerous potential 
wastes are generated.  These include (see Hanford, 2004 for more complete example 
waste models): 
 
• Human fecal and hygiene wastes 
• Trash, including food packaging, hygiene wipes and paper 
• Make-up gases for gases lost by cabin leakage 
• Systems wastes: non-regenerable particulate filters and spent sorbents 
• Thermal fluids consumed by evaporators, boilers and sublimators 
• Gaseous, liquid and solid by-products from processors 
• Inedible plant biomass 
• Used clothing 
• Used medical supplies 
 
Materials cycling within human rated habitats have the potential to be highly 
contaminated with microbial life that, if released outside of the habitat, represents a 
significant forward contamination potential. Conversely, any putative martian life forms 
that enter the habitat have the potential to become established either in humans, materials 
or hardware. These organisms may then be transported to Earth on the return voyage, 
leading to potential back contamination. ALS systems will therefore be strongly 
influenced by both forward and back contamination regulations.  
 
Likewise, supporting scientific investigations regarding the search for current or past life 
on Mars will also drive ALS system design, potentially to more restrictive levels. Of 
particular interest will be control over the release and dissemination of biosignatures from 
humans, wastes and hardware materials. 
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PP and scientific constraints therefore will likely influence the selection of life support 
operations for future human planetary exploration missions. Forward contamination 
regulations might affect the discharge of solids and liquids, and gases. For example, 
waste management systems may require processing and containment to rigorous PP 
standards prior to disposal (Hogan et al., 2005). The venting of unwanted gases from air, 
water and waste processors may also be subject to control of microbial and/or gaseous 
components (e.g., certain hydrocarbons). Crew protection and back contamination issues 
might affect ISRU operations, particularly those that generate resources that can be 
inhaled or consumed by the crew. Additionally, waste, water and air management 
systems will need to manage contaminants that enter the habitat through crew EVA 
operations, and returning samples or hardware. Additional examples of potential 
influences on life support systems include: 
 
• Closing mass loops to reduce organic inventory and the amount of material that 
requires discharge and/or venting to the martian surface. 
• Altering or restricting certain kinds of operations or processes (e.g., adding microbial 
filters on vent lines). 
• Necessitating that certain operations be performed (e.g., sterilization of disposed 
wastes). 
• Restricting what life/materials can be brought on a mission (e.g., microbial 
extremophiles). 
• Creating needs for new capabilities/technologies (e.g., extended containment). 
 
Ultimately, there will be an effect on mission costs, including the mission trade space. 
Therefore, PP and science requirements need to be considered early in technology 
development efforts.  
 
6.1.4 Starting Assumptions  
 
Additional starting assumptions were developed by the group to supplement the 
preliminary list developed prior to the workshop.  
 
• Foremost, the general consensus was that prevention of unwanted back contamination 
was the highest priority of PP. It was also agreed upon that a human surface mission 
to Mars will almost certainly result in the contamination of the internal habitat with 
martian materials. Even careful planning and specialized EVA suit design will require 
a number of seals that will likely become exposed to the martian environment. It is 
anticipated that these materials will circulate within the cabin atmosphere, and 
eventually contaminate life support systems. ALS systems will therefore need to be 
designed and operated to control the exposure of the crew to these materials, as well 
as to rigorously control the transport of these contaminants back to Earth.   
• Likewise, the presence of humans will certainly contaminate the internal habitat with 
terrestrial microorganisms and biosignatures. These materials will likely be 
transported to the martian environment via intentional/unintentional release during 
life support operations, and ingress/egress operations for EVA. ALS systems will 
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need to be designed and operated to reliably control such releases as per PP and 
science program constraints.  
• Both the PP and science programs will levy requirements that will affect ALS system 
design. PP regulations will be primarily restricted to the transfer of viable life forms 
to and from Mars. Scientific constraints may control not only the transfer of viable 
life forms, but also certain materials that may interfere with the investigation of past 
or current martian life (i.e., biosignatures). The methods employed by ALS systems to 
comply with PP and science issues may display a large overlap, but also may require 
specific development for each type of constraint.  
• Increasing the level of ALS system closure may enhance compliance with PP and 
science requirements because it decreases the amount of waste materials (solids, 
liquids and gases) that might otherwise require venting or discharge from the habitat. 
Likewise, recycling materials will decrease the overall organic inventory on the 
mission, which lowers the overall potential to contaminate Mars.  
• Due to the potentially prohibitive cost of returning waste materials to Earth, as well as 
the increased potential for back contamination, it is desirable to have wastes remain 
on Mars upon mission completion. Several processing and containment methods 
could be utilized for storage operations on Mars. Currently, there are no assumptions 
on how storage/disposal will be accomplished.  
• ALS processes that have the capacity to sterilize materials as part of their operation 
may inherently possess more benefit in fulfilling PP regulations than those that do 
not. For example, a solid waste processor that produces a sterile product facilitates the 
storage of materials on Mars without the potential for forward (microbial) 
contamination. Likewise, sterilizing technologies may also aid in the prevention of 
back contamination, and support crew health and safety.    
• The establishment of gas leakage rate requirements on habitats may affect ALS 
system design and development, and potentially require large scale hardware tests for 
verification. 
• PP regulations will vary in accordance with mission element and type. For example, 
systems that will be transported to and from Mars will have different design criteria 
than those that remain on Mars. Similarly, mission progression may create either 
increases or decreases in the strictness of regulations. For example, after the third 
Apollo landing mission, PP regulations were lifted, as no evidence of life was found 
on the moon. Table 1 discusses potential architectural considerations for PP with 


















A version of the CEV may be used in Mars missions through 




A version of the Lander may be used in Mars missions through 





A version of the Habitat may be used in Mars missions through 
spacecraft evolution development – Consider PP in original designs;  
May be used in part as a test bed for PP for Mars; it is desirable that 
the lunar habitat/lander architecture, relevant systems and airlock/dust 
lock be similar to a Mars mission. 
Mars 
Vicinity 
Transit vehicle will be a vector for forward contamination and 
backward contamination; potential use for “quarantine” during return 
trip; consideration needed for return of Mars samples. 
Pressurized 
Rover 
Interface for both forward and backward contamination; 





Interface for both forward and backward contamination.  Special 
considerations needed for 1) airlock/dust lock/rover lock; 2) spacecraft 
docking; 3) transition between hypo and micro gravity; 4) provision 
for Mars sample transfer and storage. 
 
6.1.5   Critical Open Issues 
 
Task: Identify critical open issues/uncertainties relative to PP that affect your R&TD 
(unknowns). 
 
Development of appropriate ALS systems for Mars missions in a timely and cost 
effective manner requires a comprehensive effort in overall requirements generation. This 
process may be time consuming and iterative. Therefore, preliminary identification of the 
most critical factors will facilitate ALS technology development to proceed with 
increased confidence. Listed below are significant unknowns with respect to PP issues 
that need to be addressed to facilitate ALS R&TD decision-making. In general, many of 
the issues need to be addressed early in the development cycle. 
 
• Establishment of general PP requirements – Currently, detailed PP requirements 
for human Mars missions do not exist. Development of ALS systems requires a 
reasonable set of PP guidelines to guide overall efforts. In particular, forward and 
back contamination requirements will drive systems used in the transit and habitation 
vessels, and could have a substantial impact on both component and system level 
design. Individual requirements are needed regarding the release of Earth life to the 
martian environment, and vice versa. 
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• Uncertain values for restrictions on disposal of waste materials – A primary issue 
within ALS involves the design for disposal of solids, liquids and gases during and 
after mission completion. Areas of uncertainty include; the required probability of 
containment failure, duration of containment, characteristics of disposed material 
(e.g., sterile), and effect of container location and subsurface depth. Additionally, a 
potential requirement for waste disposal is the concept of reversibility, which 
involves the ability to recover disposed wastes in subsequent missions should the 
need arise. Therefore, issues such as positioning the wastes for retrieval and needed 
containment duration need resolution. Similar issues exist regarding the venting of 
habitat liquids and gases to the martian environment.  
• Biosignature definition and release limits – Currently, there is no formal 
determination of what compounds will be designated as biosignatures, and the 
concentrations that could interfere with scientific investigations. Once biosignatures 
have been defined and identified, a list of their individual limits for release will need 
to be established. This is subject to a complex set of factors including biosignature 
longevity in the martian environment as well as the potential for dissemination due to 
wind and EVA operations.    
• Quarantining of crew and returning vessels – The assumption that the crew and 
hardware will be contaminated with martian materials will likely mandate a thorough 
quarantine procedure upon return to Earth. Both quarantine and decontamination 
procedures may influence the design and operation of ALS systems, and possibly 
mission architecture. It is critical to address this early in the design process.   
• Definition of the approach to control back contamination – The transfer of the 
crew from martian habitats to ascent and then transit vehicles will likely be 
influenced by back contamination regulations. For example, the crew may undergo 
decontamination procedures at each transfer point, and minimize the total transfer of 
materials at each step. This also involves the storage, transfer, and transport of 
martian samples. It is plausible that these protocols/design features could also 
influence ALS system development.  
• Definition and identification of zones of minimal/maximal biological risk – The 
extent to which ALS systems will be constrained by both forward and back 
contamination regulations may be strongly driven by site of martian habitation and 
surface operations. Minimizing the potential for cross-contamination may allow more 
relaxed ALS system requirements, and vice-versa.  
6.1.6   ALS R&TD Needs Resulting from Planetary Protection Requirements  
 
Task: Describe the changes to your R&TD program that you believe will be necessary 
when PP requirements are defined/flowed. Be specific about the technology areas that 
may need to be stopped/redirected/accelerated/started in development. Discuss 
development strategies that can address the lack of certain PP requirements. 
 
The ALS Program has numerous and highly integrated sub-elements, which leads to a 
complex array of potential responses to future (i.e., unknown) PP requirements. 
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Regardless, generalized predictions for R&TD needs are possible and are discussed 
below:  
• Control of forward contamination (including biosignatures) – ALS systems can 
control forward contamination through various means. Microbial destruction and/or 
control can be implemented via mineralization, sanitization, sterilization, stabilization 
and containment of final waste products. This includes both Earth-based and ET life 
forms. Stabilization/mineralization of waste materials will also decrease the 
biological and chemical reactions during storage/disposal or further processing steps. 
This also can reduce or eliminate potential microbial substrate that could be used for 
the proliferation of ET life. General housekeeping operations can also employ 
frequent decontamination operations, such as microbial disinfection of surfaces. 
Many science-based requirements could likewise use the above-listed methods, and 
may require even more stringent operations to control biosignature release.  
• Containment of disposed waste materials – It is almost assured that PP and science 
requirements would initially necessitate the containment of solid and liquid materials 
discharged to the martian environment. The level of influence on ALS system design 
will depend on the level of containment required (release standards), the state of the 
material being contained (e.g., dried, sterilized, mineralized), the duration of 
containment (e.g., >50 years, or a period that ensures reversibility), and positioning of 
the containers (above or sub-surface). Containers may be required to be relatively 
durable if stored external to the habitat, and may impose a substantial mass and 
volume penalty. Overall containment requirements will also be driven by the waste 
processing systems that are employed. For example, compaction and mineralization 
can significantly decrease the needed storage volume. Likewise, mineralization, 
sterilization and drying can also reduce the potential for forward contamination, and 
may decrease the volume and mass of containment systems. 
• Control of venting – The venting of gases may be regulated by PP and science 
constraints to various degrees. Examples of requirements include the 
control/elimination of particulates of living and dead life forms, as well as the control 
of certain gases (deemed to be a biosignature) that interfere with scientific 
measurements. All ALS systems, and the habitat in general, will therefore need to 
either selectively control or eliminate vented gases. Particle filters and air treatment 
systems such as adsorbents and catalytic systems may be employed. Elimination of 
gases would require either closure of the system with respect to materials cycling, or 
the capture and storage of unwanted gases, perhaps in spent tanks. Because the 
martian atmosphere is primarily composed of CO2, it is likely that spent CO2 from 
CO2 removal systems will be allowed to be vented. However, current CO2 removal 
technologies typically expel numerous gases and compounds other than CO2 in a 
mixed stream, and may therefore be regulated. Similarly, water and waste processing 
systems often produce highly contaminated exhaust streams that might require 
exhaust treatment and/or containment. 
• Control of back contamination – Numerous ALS systems will be involved in the 
control of introduced martian materials. The air treatment system will be responsible 
for removing contaminants from the cabin atmosphere, the water recovery system 
will be responsible for treating water to ensure control over contamination of crew via 
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ingestion, and waste processing will need to manage materials that may have been 
directly or indirectly contaminated with martian materials. Likewise food and 
biomass production systems may need to develop procedures to control the 
contamination of human foodstuffs and plant growth chambers.   
• Organic inventory control – The primary method used in robotic missions to control 
contamination (PP and science-based) is the reduction of organic inventory. 
Employing this approach to human missions may result in the preference to 
mineralize organic waste materials when plausible. Likewise, increased mass closure 
via recycling will effectively reduce the overall stores. In a related theme, it was 
discussed that in addition to the dominating load of microbial biomass associated with 
the human intestinal tract, biological systems that either generate significant amounts 
of organic material (food production systems) or those that possess high microbial 
biomass (e.g., biological water and waste processors) may introduce a greater 
potential for both forward contamination with Earth life forms. It was also noted that 
the presence of biological systems (e.g., humans and other biological systems) may 
serve as a resource for back contamination by serving as a food source and 
“incubator”. This was countered by the possibility that martian life may be more 
suited to inorganic environments, and may survive better in common hardware than 
in competitive carbon substrate-based biological communities.     
• Re-examine and modify ALS reference mission designs – Systems analysts can 
generate initial designs of potential technology suites (and costs) that satisfy 
(anticipated) PP and science requirements by redesigning current ALS reference 
mission scenarios. 
• Increase efforts to quantify and characterize ALS system process streams – 
Identifying waste, water and air streams is needed to assess forward contamination 
potential and mitigation technologies.  
• Perform investigations to assess the effect of contaminant releases from the 
cabin atmosphere via leakage and potential intentional venting operations - 
These efforts may require physical simulation and /or test-beds. An important 
consideration is determining the contribution of the martian environment (e.g., 
radiation, temperature) towards passive mitigation of forward contaminants.  
 
Strategies for ALS System Development Given Uncertain PP Requirements: 
PP regulations, waste streams, and ALS system requirements require further definition 
for human Mars missions. Additionally, established requirements may be altered as 
information from future robotic missions becomes available. Regardless, technology 
development must progress to meet the anticipated mission timelines. Potential methods 
to minimize development cost and the risk of mission delay and/or failure in the face of 
uncertain PP and science requirements include: 
• Promote acceleration of the definition of PP and science requirements. Incorporate 
known PP requirements in ALS technology requirements and be responsive to 
changes in knowledge regarding the martian environment. Provide ALS data to 
support PP requirement development.  
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• Maintain communication between and among PP and other communities (e.g., 
MEPAG) to enhance co-evolution of requirements generation.  
• Identify critical technology gaps in ALS technology availability that are required to 
satisfy predicted PP and scientific regulations. 
• Develop ALS systems that are flexible in application over various mission 
segments/scenarios. For example, modular waste containment systems could be 
designed that would function effectively for transit vehicles and surface habitats, and 
both inside and outside of the habitat.  
• Develop ALS systems that can satisfy conservative PP requirements. These systems 
will therefore be suitable to a broader range of mission needs, and will be more 
suitable should life be found on Mars either before or during the mission.   
• Perform system analyses that identify the full range of potential mission-specific 
conditions and then select/design ALS technology suites that satisfy the bulk of the 
most plausible conditions. Examine the degree of closure as a method to support 
PP/scientific requirements.  
• Perform sensitivity analyses of specific PP/science-based requirements. This involves 
the identification of scientific and technical requirements that are the most influential, 
and addressing these first if possible.   
• Develop a priority of preferred means of complying with PP requirements. For 
example, it is probable that overall risk reduction will likely stem from the 
elimination of potential contaminants, rather than mere containment. Less secure 
methods may meet PP regulations solely by containment with no reduction in life or 
organic inventory. These preferences will serve as additional input to the overall ALS 
system selection process. 
6.1.7   Contaminants and Pathways 
 
Task: Identify potential contaminants and pathways for ALS systems with respect to 
forward and back contamination. 
 
Potential Forward Contaminants: 
Numerous types of materials used in space missions become wastes, and require 
management of some form. In addition to the commonly considered materials (see list 
below), it is necessary to consider the status of the various vehicles, rovers and habitats 
after final use. Due to the high cost of up-loading from planetary surfaces, large units will 
likely be left on the planet surface, potentially with large amounts of waste solids, water 
and gas. If they are not reused in the future, the vehicle and its contents are technically 
wastes, and require a termination management plan.  
 
• Human life support system wastes – Human life support systems span multiple 
system types, and can produce vast amounts of waste comprising numerous 
constituents. IExamples include, but are not limited to, human solid wastes and wipes, 
medical wastes, clothing, paper, trash, tape, food waste, inedible biomass from crops, 
packaging, wastewater brines, EVA wastes, biological processor system wastes (e.g., 
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sludge), filters and free or tanked gases. Many of these wastes will be sources of life 
forms/biosignature materials (even certain inorganic materials). Additionally, ALS 
systems utilize orbital or field replacement units that require intermittent replacement. 
This could generate wastes ranging from small pieces such as o-rings, to full-scale 
hardware systems, such as redundant water treatment units. 
 
• Payload wastes – These include materials generated from a broad array of scientific 
investigations, and may consist of numerous types of chemicals, solids, and biological 
materials.  
 
• Planetary investigation wastes – In addition to payload science wastes, other wastes 
may be generated during the study of martian surface materials. For example, surface 
samples will require a high level of containment and sanitation during investigations, 
potentially generating consumable materials needed to prepare and preserve samples 
and disinfect and clean surfaces and equipment. These materials are prominent 
sources of back contamination. 
 
• Thermal/Power generation system wastes – Various waste types may be generated 
from thermal control/power systems, including radiators, heat exchange fluids, solar 
arrays and nuclear wastes. Some systems will emit large amounts of waste heat, and 
can potentially disrupt local environments/ecology (e.g., melting of surface ice).  
 
• Miscellaneous – Materials normally not anticipated to enter the WM system may 
have been inadvertently overlooked, or may be generated during off-nominal events. 
Mission-specific waste analyses will be necessary to identify these potential sources, 
and develop contingency management plans.  
 
Potential Forward Contamination Pathways: 
 
The major identified forward contamination pathways are listed below: 
 
• Egress of humans, equipment and samples – EVA activities possess a strong 
potential to act as a vector for introducing Earth life/biosignatures to the external 
environment, as it is practically impossible to sterilize and clean suits and equipment 
materials in a complete and consistent fashion. EVA suit engineering efforts may be 
able to minimize such transfer by designing suits that remain external to the 
habitat/rover, while allowing a hatch that seals against the vessel for human transfer. 
Regardless, some contamination is expected, particularly when samples and 
equipment are transferred in and out of the vessel. Decontamination procedures may 
be required.   
 
• Storage and/or disposal of wastes on planetary surface – Surface storage of wastes 
would isolate them from the crew, recover internal habitat volume, reduce the 
opportunity for back contamination, and greatly minimize return propulsion costs. 
Although surface disposal will likely utilize containment, it is inevitable that all 
containers will eventually fail. Only the extent of leakage and container life-span are 
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variable and contained contents will be released at some point. Therefore, it must be 
determined if storage/disposal on the surface is acceptable, and if so, what level of 
containment (i.e., release standards) is required, the required state of the 
stored/disposed wastes, and how long containment must endure. Burial of containers 
under the surface would serve to indefinitely contain most wastes if the container 
failed. However, underground storage may shield the wastes from the destructive 
forces of radiation, and may enhance the possibility of unwanted infiltration into 
martian ecosystems (via potential liquid aquifers). 
 
• Leakage from habitat, airlocks and other vessels – All pressurized vessels leak 
gases to some extent, based on the pressure differential and the degree of “gas-
tightness”. While vessels can be designed to minimize leakage rates, this typically 
imposes a mass penalty. Intentional venting of waste gases to the planet atmosphere is 
performed to ensure crew safety and to save processing and storage costs. Gases and 
associated particulates may also be lost during human and equipment egress/ingress 
operations via airlocks. Off-nominal losses may also occur during unplanned vessel 
depressurization, or safety pressure-relief valves. Water losses in liquid or gaseous 
form may occur through similar mechanisms, or through line ruptures. There is no 
anticipated mechanism where solid wastes (other than airborne particulates) would 
nominally “leak” from a vessel. Instead, a significant rupture, depressurization or 
other opening would likely be required to allow solids to flow overboard. Such an 
event would have the potential to release large amounts of contaminants, and must be 
considered when establishing operational protocols.   
 
Potential Back Contaminants and Pathways: 
 
For purposes of this discussion, back contamination is technically defined as martian life2 
and any martian solid or liquid material that is considered a potential vector of martian 
life. Such contaminants can enter via nearly any contact/exchange with the martian 
environment, and have the potential to negatively effect human health and safety, and 
possibly Earth ecosystems. It is anticipated that EVA, ISRU operations, and spacecraft 
docking/personnel transfer will be significant back contamination pathways. Primary 
mechanisms include EVA ingress/egress with associated equipment and geological and 
astrobiological samples, airlocks/transferlocks/dustlocks, spacecraft docking 
mechanisms, and ISRU resource generation and use. Back contaminants that enter 
habitats are anticipated to become widespread throughout nearly all ALS systems via 
airborne transmission, contact transfer (e.g., sample handling, multiple surface contact) 
and internal systems transport (e.g., water lines, filters).  Back contamination can also be 





                                                 
2  Even if it is uncertain whether martian life exists, PP controls will likely reflect a conservative approach 
similar to that recommended by the NRC (1997) for Mars sample return missions—namely, all materials 
will be considered biohazardous until proven otherwise by rigorous analyses. 
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6.1.8   Mitigation Alternatives 
 
Task: Identify plausible mitigation alternatives and obstacles for specific mission types 
and segments (e.g., transit, surface stay). 
 
Forward Contamination Mitigation Alternatives:  
 
• Inter-planetary disposal of wastes, liquids and gases generated during transit mission 
to Mars will decrease the amount of contaminants and organic inventory that are near 
or on Mars and Earth. 
• Preferentially employ processes that destroy terrestrial and ET life, and their potential 
for later reestablishment. Representative processes include mineralization, 
stabilization and sterilization, in combination with complementary post-processing 
containment systems.   
• Employ processes that control and decrease organic inventory (biosignatures). This 
includes mineralization, containment and materials recycling.  
• Employ material selection and exclusion practices to reduce or eliminate materials 
that pose a high contamination risk or complex management operations. Utilize 
materials that facilitate decontamination (e.g., can withstand autoclaving, chemical 
disinfectants).  
• Develop general procedures (e.g., Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point - HAACP, 
airlocks) and decontamination (e.g., disinfection wipes) operations for habitat internal 
surfaces and hardware for both “general housekeeping” and contingency situations. 
Likewise, decontamination procedures will be needed for equipment, EVA suits, 
waste containers, etc. that undergo egress.  
• Utilize vent-less life support processes and processing vented materials. 
• Employ system-level designs that minimize contamination risk, including habitat 
zoning or compartmentalizing and/or independent controls and life support such as 
isolated, independent ventilation systems. 
• Utilize contaminant monitoring and alarming systems to provide real-time 
verification of ALS system performance (See AEMC section). 
• Design interfaces with EVA, airlocks and rovers to control contaminant transfer.  
Back Contamination Mitigation Alternatives: 
• Minimize the amount of materials that have contacted the martian environment which 
are brought back into the habitat or returned to Earth. This could entail leaving 
materials on Mars, or jettisoning them in interplanetary space prior to Earth entry.  
• As with forward contamination, preferentially employ ALS processes that destroy 
potential martian life, and their potential for proliferation/reestablishment.   
• Develop general nominal and contingency procedures and decontamination 
operations for internal habitat surfaces/systems, and for equipment, samples, EVA 
suits, etc. that undergo habitat ingress, and/or that will be returned to Earth.  
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• Consider storing samples to be returned to Earth outside the habitation compartment 
of returning vessel to support crew health and safety. Potentially enclose samples in 
external compartments that are designed to ensure sample integrity and jettisoning if 
required.   
• Develop protocols for the transfer of personnel, materials, and hardware from 
contaminated vehicles to clean vehicles during Mars ascent, Earth transit and landing.  
• Consider developing systems to minimize gravity-settled materials (including 
contamination) from becoming airborne after lift-off (as vehicle transitions from Mars 
fractional gravity to microgravity).  
• Develop monitoring systems that can signify the potential presence of back 
contaminants, with associated alarming systems (see AEMC report summary). 
• Employ system-level vehicle designs that minimize contamination risk, including 
habitat zoning or compartmentalizing and/or independent controls and life support.  
 
6.1.9   Identification of Major Obstacles  
 
Task: Identify PP requirements that impose the greatest mission/development costs for 
ALS 
 
• “Breaking the chain of contact” for backward contamination. Although the workshop 
consensus was that breaking the chain of contact from Mars to Earth is nearly 
impossible, minimization will be sought. This will entail avoiding contamination of 
the humans and hardware via multiple technological and operational steps.  This may 
involve operations on Mars surface or orbit, transit, Earth orbit, and Earth surface 
activities, and could influence overall mission architecture.  
• Rigorous constraints on material releases to the martian environment, especially the 
management of solid and liquid wastes. This could entail the development of 
sophisticated processors and disposal systems. The venting of gases can readily be 
managed to comply with PP requirements (e.g., microbial filters), but potential 
scientific constraints may require substantial processing. Additional impacts will be 
imposed upon thermal, food technologies and biomass production systems.  
 
6.1.10   Planetary Protection Requirements Definition  
 
Task: Identify PP requirements/topics that require further definition. 
 
• Identification of materials that are considered to be contamination (PP and scientific), 
and the levels of release that will be allowable.   
• Definition and identification of zones of minimal and maximal biological risk, and 
their effect on ALS system development for specific missions.  
• Examine the potential for interplanetary disposal during transit, and what conditions 
would be imposed concerning expulsion, trajectory, proximity to planetary bodies, 
waste state and types. 
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• Determine if storage or disposal of wastes will be allowed on/below the martian 
surface, or in abandoned vehicles. If so, identify containment requirements regarding 
duration, efficiency, waste state, degree of certainty, etc..   
• Determine constraints as to what will be allowed to be returned to Earth (i.e., 
potential for back-contamination).  Identify quarantine procedures that will be 
required for samples, crew and returning vessels. 
• The inside of the returning spacecraft may be contaminated to some degree.  
Therefore, identify how ALS systems can support back contamination control in all 
phases of the mission. 
• Identify how ALS operations must be conducted to control forward contamination 
(e.g., increased bioloads on suits and equipment, venting gases/liquids/particulates to 
planetary atmosphere via airlocks). For example, how "clean" does the habitat need to 
be in order to support external PP requirements?   
• Identify special measures that should be taken to avoid the propagation of putative 
extraterrestrial organisms in ALS (and other) systems.  
• Examine how ALS technologies will manage contingency situations, such as 
unexpected waste generation from planned or unplanned biological experiments, or 
the discovery of free-living extraterrestrial life in the habitat. 
• Identify the types of ALS monitoring and control systems, procedures and equipment 
that are necessary to assist in implementation and verification of PP compliance. This 
includes issues regarding contamination of the planetary surface, habitat 
contamination and return of spacecraft, astronauts and samples to Earth.  
6.1.11   Overall Recommendations 
 
Task: List major conclusions from group deliberations. 
 
• PP and science-based requirements will have a strong effect on ALS system R&TD.   
Scientific limitations on releases of hydrocarbons or other chemical/materials may 
exert a stronger impact on some R&TD costs and efforts than PP requirements. 
Overall, these requirements affect technology trade options and development costs.  
Development of PP and scientific requirements for human missions should be 
accelerated, especially in the areas of discharge and disposal limits, backward 
contamination limits, and ISRU.  
• The ALS community should identify the potential for forward contamination via 
further definition of initial material inventory, process products and release 
mechanisms. This information must be shared with the PP and scientific communities 
to facilitate requirements generation.  
• Identify critical ALS technology and requirements gaps. Use best estimates of 
available PP, scientific and ALS requirements to guide ALS technology development 
accordingly. Employing conservative (stricter) requirements should be considered as 
it yields technologies that possess increased functionality and mission applicability.    
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• Perform analyses of mission scenarios using various ALS technology suites to 
comply with predicted requirements early in the development process.  If the 
calculated costs of plausible solutions are deemed excessive, seek further verification 
or reexamination of PP and scientific requirements, and/or identify alternative ALS 
system R&TD needs.  
• It is imperative to maintain open communication between the PP, scientific, AEVA, 
AEMC, ALS and other relevant communities regarding advances in knowledge 
related to PP requirements and concerns. These systems operate in an integrated 
fashion, and require coordination for mission success. 
 
6.2    REPORT OF THE ADVANCED EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 
SPECIALIZED BREAKOUT GROUP (2) 
 
6.2.1   Participants of Specialized Breakout Group 2 – Advanced Extravehicular 
Activity   
 








6.2.2 Group Charge 
 
The AEVA Specialized Breakout Group was responsible for examining the influences of 
PP issues on the task of providing humans with portable life support systems and 
vehicular mobility. Specific charges are listed below: The AEVA group was charged with 
the following tasks:  
• Identify potential contaminants and pathways for AEVA systems with respect to 
forward and backward contamination. 
• Identify plausible mitigation alternatives and obstacles for pertinent missions. 
• Identify topics that require further research and technology development and discuss 
development strategies with uncertain PP requirements. 
• Identify PP requirements that impose the greatest mission/development costs. 
• Identify PP requirements/topics that require further definition. 
• Develop overall recommendations on PP relative to AEVA development. 
 
6.2.3   Background Information and Starting Assumptions 
 
Background Information:  The present Shuttle space suit system, or Extravehicular 
Mobility Unit (EMU) has been in use since 1981, and has accumulated a significant 
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number of operational hours in that time.  In addition, airlock systems on both ISS and 
Shuttle have been in operation long enough to understand the operational implications 
associated with operation of airlocks on the martian surface.  Martian planetary surface 
airlock operations, based on ISS configuration (2-crewmember size) would be expected 
to conduct a depressurization cycle that would store the gas in the airlock until reaching a 
pressure of ≈ 3.0 psia.  Once at that level, the residual gas, including any included spores, 
biosignatures and other material, would be vented to the external environment.  This 
includes ≈ 2.0 pounds of gas per depressurization cycle.  Due to the high power 
requirements to pump out this final fraction, it is unlikely that airlock designs for Mars 
would be able to avoid that final venting to the environment. 
 
Preliminary design concepts based on a new “minimum volume” design can reduce that 
vented volume to some extent.  Assuming the volume of the airlock can accommodate 
two crewmembers, and the residual volume is ≈ 2 times the suited crewmember volume, 
the gas vented to the environment at the end of depressurization is expected to be 0.97 
pounds per cycle.  However, a minimum volume airlock will aggravate back 
contamination concerns due to issues associated with donning and doffing EVA suits, 
unless a “suit-port” type of airlock is adopted.  Evaluations of suit port designs are 
presently underway; however, it is still expected that a volume of air ≈ 1 pound per 
airlock cycle will be vented to the martian environment with every air lock cycle. 
 
Space suit leak rates can be approximated using the Shuttle EMU, which has measured 
leak rates.  The total suit assembly leakage based on a representative Shuttle EMU is 
indicated in Table 2 (each suit): 
 
                 TABLE 2. TOTAL SUIT ASSEMBLY LEAKAGE RATES/SUIT 
Component Ground Leakage In-Space Leakage  
Arms (each) 31.5 sccm*/air 9.0 sccm/O2
Lower torso 24.5 sccm/air 7.0 sccm/O2
Gloves (each) 10.5 sccm/air 3.0 sccm/O2
Upper torso 21.0 sccm/air 6.0 sccm/O2
Helmet 7.0 sccm/air 2.0 sccm/O2
TOTAL LEAKAGE 136.5 sccm/air 39.0 sccm/O2
                                       *sccm = standard cubic centimeter per minute 
 
Additional leakage of constituents from portable life support system (PLSS) comes from 
the following areas: 
• Vent system loop (connector fittings) 
• Oxygen supply source (gaseous or cryogenic) 
• Heat removal system (water boiler; ~1 lb/hr.)  
o (Note: If a water boiler is used, constituent water will contain and may release 
contaminants from the ALS water processor system) 
 
Venting systems for regenerable CO2 and humidity control are currently among leading 
contenders to limit expendables and reduce on-back weight.  These systems, however, 
will release ullage (unfilled) volume of space suit atmosphere as well as separated CO2, 
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H2O, and internal trace contaminants, including ≈ 2 lbs CO2/EVA, ≈ 1.5 lbs H2O/EVA,   
≈ 0.02 lbs O2/EVA, as well as other contaminants. Higher O2 losses are possible with 
ejectors and other possible technologies. Finally there are other potential venting 
considerations during assisted operations, emergency operations, external EVA recharge 
or equipment change-out activities. 
 
There are additional potential contamination constituents associated with EVA 
operations, which include:  
• Trace chemical contaminants associated with suit leakage 
• Lubricants associated with surface support vehicles and suit bearings 
• Suit surface contaminants from habitat and human contact 
• Elastomeric/fabric materials from surface support vehicles and outer materials of 
space suit  
• Mechanical abrasion of external suit components against vehicle surfaces and martian 
outcrops 
• Off-gassing of volatiles associated with organic compounds used in the suit outer 
layers 
Starting Assumptions: Basic robotic mission PP guidelines and requirements, if applied 
to equipment and hardware on human-based missions are deemed unrealistic and most 
likely un-achievable in terms of sterilization and levels of microbial spore densities.  Due 
to the nature of EVA systems, particularly pressure garment assemblies and portable life 
support systems, leak rates will always be >0, and pathways exist for release of spores 
and biosignatures to the martian environment. 
 
• For forward contamination concerns, the basic assumption is that missions 
carrying humans to Mars will contaminate the planet. 
• For backward contamination concerns, the basic assumption is that humans 
inevitably will be exposed to Mars surface materials. 
 
6.2.4  Contaminants and Pathways 
 
Identified Forward Contamination Issues: 
 
• Leak Paths and Rates Associated With Candidate Advanced Planetary EVA Systems: 
The present planned EVA suit for advance planetary operations is based on the 
concept of a modularly-constructed suit assembly to increase logistics, 
interchangeability and commonality of components.  This concept is represented by 
planetary prototype NASA-JSC MK III advanced technology suit.  As part of this 
effort, the team identified ≈50 separate potential leakage path areas represented by 
static seals, dynamic seals, and connector hardware pass-thru locations.  This does not 
take into consideration all individual gas bladder heat-sealed or adhesively-bonded 
seams or natural permeation characteristics of the bladder material based on wear and 
abrasion.  The potential leak paths include: 
 
- Helmet to neck-ring 
- Neck-ring to hard upper torso 
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- Rear hatch to hard upper torso 
- Shoulder joints to hard upper torso (2 ea.) 
- Shoulder bearings (2 ea.) 
- Upper arm bearings (2 ea.) 
- Upper arm sizing elements to elbow joints (2 ea.) 
- Lower arm sizing elements to elbow joints (2 ea.) 
- Wrist disconnects to lower arm sizing elements (2 ea.) 
- Glove disconnects w/bearings to wrist disconnects (2 ea.) 
- Glove assemblies flange-mounted to glove disconnects (2 ea.) 
- Waist ring to hard upper torso 
- Waist bearing 
- Waist ring rolling convolute joint to brief element 
- Upper hip bearings to brief element (2 ea.) 
- Upper hip bearings (2 ea.) 
- Mid-hip bearings (2 ea.) 
- Lower hip bearings (2 ea.) 
- Lower hip bearings to abduction/adduction ring (2 ea.) 
- Abduction/adduction ring to upper leg sizing (2 ea.) 
- Upper leg sizing elements to knee joints (2 ea.) 
- Lower leg sizing elements to knee joints (2 ea.) 
- Lower leg sizing elements to ankle bearings (2 ea.) 
- Ankle bearings (2 ea.) 
- Ankle bearings to boot flange interface (2 ea.) 
- Boot flange interface to boots (2 ea.) 
 
Despite the number of leak paths, the robustness of the MK III suit is indicated by the 
fact that after ≈ 950 hours of pressurized use over the past 17 years, total leakage 
rates are on the order of 1,500 – 2,000 sccm after normal 40 hour maintenance 
periods. In addition, the MK III suit has been run for most of its life in a terrestrial 
pressure environment. Leak rates in the ≈ 0.01 atm martian environment are expected 
to be considerably lower. 
 
• Humans produce a variety of trace contaminants that are present in the atmosphere of 
the pressure garment. Some portion of these contaminants will inevitably be vented to 
the martian environment. The list of relevant contaminants produced and their 
allowable concentrations in the spacecraft atmosphere are presented in Table 3. 
 
The above values represent trace contaminant human products that would be components 
of all space suit leakage and vent gases from airlocks/habitats. Various toxicological trace 
contaminant products and Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMAC’s) for 
Selected Airborne Contaminants developed by the National Research Council Committee 
on Toxicology can be found on web-site: 
http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/toxicology/SMACbooks.htm.  In addition, materials used in 
construction of the pressure garment are allowed to off-gas a wide range of organic and 




TABLE 3.  TRACE CONTAMINANT PRODUCTION RATES AND 
ALLOWABLE ATMOSPHERIC STANDARDS 
 




Ammonia 0.25 25 
Methane 0.047 1000 
Acetaldehyde  0.000083 10 
Acetone 0.00013 100 
Ethyl Alcohol 0.004 17 
Methyl Alcohol 0.0014 13 
n-Butyl Alcohol 0.0013 3 
Methyl Mercaptan 0.00083 0.1 
Hydrogen Sulfide 0.000075 1 
       
 
Any compounds associated with presumed martian organic life that are being planned as 
biosignatures may potentially be confused with any of the above compounds produced 
and vented by the human and/or the EVA system. 
 
Identified Backward Contamination Issues: 
• Backward contamination pathways exist during normal EVA surface operations.  
These pathways represent the kinds of operations that will take place on a daily to 
weekly basis, and they include:  
– Airlock operations 
 Transport of dust and regolith materials from surface into airlock and 
subsequent habitat living areas 
 Crew contamination during don – e.g., inhalation/ingestion during EVA or 
inseparable contact transfer into habitat and to Earth. 
– Return from remote EVA worksites and surface traverses 
 Transport of “non-documented/classified” surface materials back into 
airlock/habitat living areas 
– Geologic/Astro-biological sample collection activities (surface and sub-surface 
operations) 
 All of the above concerns associated with human-assisted operations  
 Handling of samples in situ or in habitat laboratory for analysis 
– Transfer EVA prep / servicing / maintenance items into habitat 
 Surface contaminants and contaminants in cavities, seal regions, porous 
materials, between layers, etc. 
 Limitations of practicable cleaning processes prior to airlock entry/in airlock 
– ISRU Operations Phase 






TABLE 4. FAMILIES OF COMPOUNDS THAT OFF-GAS FROM PRESSURE   
                  GARMENTS AND ASSOCIATED ALLOWABLE ATMOSPHERIC  
                  CONCENTRATIONS 
 




Alcohols (as Methanol) 32 10 
Aldehydes (as Acrolein) 56 0.1 
Aromatic Hydrocarbons (as 
Benzene) 
78 3.0 
Esters (as Methyl Butyrate) 102 30 
Ethers (as Furan) 68 0.11 










Hydrocarbons (as N-Pentane) 72 3.0 







(as Methyl Mercaptan) 
48 0.2 
Oxides of Nitrogen  
(as Nitrogen Dioxide) 
46 0.9 
Organic Acids  
(as Acetic Acid) 
60 5 
Organic Nitrogens  
(as Monomethyl Hydrazine) 
46 0.3 
Organic Sulfides  




6.2.5    Recommendations 
 
General.  The AEVA community needs realistic guidelines and requirements for EVA 
PP that are; a) tolerant of EVA hardware systems design feasibility limitations, b) have 
technical practicality, c) have minimum impact to mission planning and operations, d) 
have an architecture so as not to affect human functional performance capabilities, and e) 
are acceptable to both the PP and science communities. These guidelines and 
requirements will drive cost; the only way to reasonably mitigate these costs is to identify 
these guidelines and requirements early in the development cycle.  With respect to 
biosignatures, the AEVA community knows gaseous components that vent from the suit, 
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but it does not know what levels of these constituents are acceptable from a forward 
contamination or science standpoint.   
 
The AEVA community presently does not know what level of biological material is 
released from any EMU during the course of normal operations. Therefore, the 
community recommends conducting human space suit chamber tests to determine 
biological and chemical signature characterizations generated by current space suit 
system venting and leakage effluents using sample tracer elements or markers.  
 
The Planetary Protection community needs to develop a classification system of Mars 
surface sites based on level of scientific interest and define “zones of operation” ranging 
from “no human contact” to “unlimited contact”. Lastly, the PP community needs to 
empirically identify and determine what level of microbial spore density and 
chemical/organic constituents are allowable for EVA surface operations. 
 
Specific Overall AEVA System Recommendations 
 
• Define specific surface task activities that would require the implementation of 
appropriate PP measures. 
- Need specific input to define tasks and requirements 
 
• Describe and define the potential physical (chemical or biological) impacts that the 
identified suit/PLSS vent/leakage constituents would have in regard towards PP 
“forward” contamination concerns. 
- Conduct human suited subject chamber tests to determine the actual products that 
are vented during suit operations. 
 
• Determine what levels of PP “backward” contamination control are possible or 
needed for EVA systems( suits, PLSS, airlocks, rovers). 
- Develop appropriate operational protocols to minimize transfer of contamination 
products into the habitat. 
- Consider the requirements associated with periodic inspection and maintenance, 
in order to maximize the time between inspection and minimize crew exposure to 
martian materials. 
 
• Determine what effect the natural martian environment (UV, radiation, thermal, 
pressure) would have towards “natural mitigation” of potential Earth-based 
contaminants.  
- Collect/develop information on release/escape of microbes from suits and airlocks 
and development of detection and monitoring sensors and procedures. 
- Develop suit simulation tests based on human subject testing described above. 
 
6.2.6   Mitigation Alternatives 
 
Task: Discuss Plausible Mitigating Approaches for Human EVA Operations  
 
• Minimize surface contact area of initial human-EVA supported activities: 
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- Use robotic precursors (tele-operated or autonomous mode) to scout and survey  
intended EVA worksite locations and potential science way-point stations prior to 
human intervention. 
 Obstacle – Potentially high cost and time overhead associated with robotic 
vehicle operations; also, limitations associated with robotic vehicles as such 
(lack of real-time decision making, intuition and judgment)  
• Identify “safe” and “no-go” zones adjacent to and within x-radius distance of 
lander/habitat location and develop method of control for human-EVA supported 
traffic in the landing area.   
 Obstacle – May not be able to totally exclude “chance encounter” with “oasis-
of-life”; potentially restrictive for critical surface operations (location of ISRU 
plant or power-plant distribution elements) 
• Reduce or eliminate EVA-system element contamination sources. 
- Vent gases, leakages, trace chemical contaminants, material abrasion, etc. 
 Obstacle – Not totally practical; through normal use and wear conditions over 
time, all potential contamination sources will increase and accumulate. Also a 
real restriction on life support technology choices 
• Screen, identify and catalog all Earth-based “signature” materials associated with 
EVA-system elements in order to recognize and compare against potential “alien” 
life-bearing materials: 
- Develop “Contamination Materials Reference Guideline” 
 Obstacle – time and cost maybe excessively prohibitive; also, may not fully 
capture all associated materials and constituents  
• To potentially mitigate “backward” PP contamination, quarantine, isolate or discard 
all EVA surface-exposed hardware items (other than scientific samples) at habitat 
base-site as a “non-return” to Earth policy: 
- Provide “peel-off layer” over portions of suit to remove/discard prior to airlock 
entry 
- “Decontaminate” EVA hardware items prior to airlock entry 
 Obstacle – need to assess logistics and costs associated with “throw-away” 
versus “re-use” philosophy. 
» Limited effectiveness given transfer of contaminants to crew and habitat 
 
6.2.7   R&TD Needs   
 
Task: Identify PP EVA System Topics Requiring Further Research & Technology 
Development. 
 
• Improved space suit design features consistent with PP needs, especially for the 
demands of human activities on the martian surface located away from pressurized 
habitats and rovers (from Race et al., 2003): 
- Define specific surface task activities that would require the implementation of 
appropriate PP measures 
- Potential modification or redesign of suit/PLSS venting systems applicable to 
Mars surface situations 
• Describe and define the potential physical (chemical or biological) impacts that the 
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identified suit/PLSS vent/leakage constituents would have in regard towards PP 
“forward” contamination concerns: 
- Determination of levels of filtration that are possible or needed for EVA systems; 
suits, PLSS, airlocks, rovers 
- Information on release/escape of microbes from suits and airlocks and 
development of detection and monitoring sensors and procedures 
• Determine what effect the natural martian environment (UV, radiation, thermal, 
pressure) would have towards “natural mitigation” of potential Earth-based 
contaminants.  
 
6.3    REPORT OF THE ADVANCED ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND 
CONTROL (AEMC) SPECIALIZED BREAKOUT GROUP (3)  
 
6.3.1    Participants of Specialized Breakout Group 3 – Advanced Environmental 
Monitoring and Control 
 




Charlie (Mark) Ott 
Richard Sauer 
Kasthuri Venkateswaran  
 
6.3.2   Group Charge 
 
The primary task of the AEMC Specialized Breakout Group was to identify and address 
the monitoring and control needs of human missions to Mars in relation to potential PP 
regulations. The AEMC group was charged with the following tasks: 
 
• Identify monitoring and control needs to support PP for pertinent missions. 
• Identify potential contaminants or effects related to monitoring and control hardware 
systems (if any). 
• Identify topics that require further research and technology development and discuss 
development strategies with uncertain PP requirements. 
• Identify PP requirements that impose the greatest mission/development costs. 
• Identify PP requirements/topics that require further definition. 
• Overall recommendations. 
 
6.3.3   Monitoring and Control Needs 
 
Task: Identify monitoring and control needs to support PP for pertinent missions. 
 
The group’s understanding is that although the current PP standards for forward 
contamination control include culturable bacterial spores, other targets (e.g., viruses, 
prions, eukaryotic cells) could be included in new standards. AEMC, motivated by crew
 48
  
health requirements, would also target these organisms, though possibly with different 
emphases and sensitivity levels.  
 
The AEMC group tried to anticipate, as a strawman, a possible level for forward 
contamination monitoring capability for a human mission. As a first estimate, the group 
considered the current specification for a Category IVa non-life detection mission. (Later 
the PP group suggested Class 100,000 cleanroom assembly.) The requirement for back 
contamination was more difficult to grasp, and the group was not able to come up with a 
strawman specification. 
 
The group expects that monitoring for PP requirements would be required during all 
phases of a mission: pre-launch, transit, pre-use, surface operations, return, and post-
return. The different phases would likely require different technologies and different 
logistics. It was expected that monitoring would be required both within and outside any 
crewed enclosure (namely, inside and outside a habitat, rover, suit, transit vehicle, etc.). 
 
The AEMC group discussed mitigation options. Mitigation is not historically part of 
AEMC, but the group felt that it is an important process to consider. Mitigation would be 
the set of processes which would reduce the microbial load. For example, cleaning up 
after a small spill could involve a simple wipe up process.  It might be also be necessary 
to quarantine a spill zone. 
 
6.3.4   Current AEMC Sensitivity Levels 
 
The AEMC Program Element develops technology for monitoring chemistry and 
microbiology of the crew habitat, as well as process control approaches. It is not only 
likely that some of the microbial monitoring technologies under AEMC development 
would be relevant to PP, in fact AEMC leverages the existing NASA PP infrastructure 
and expertise, as well as the analogous resources in Astrobiology. It is also recognized 
that the requirements for crew health monitoring are likely to be different in detail from 
PP requirements. 
 
The current portfolio of AEMC microbial detection technologies ranges from TRL 3, for 
which feasibility is to be demonstrated, through TRL 5, in which a component is being 
validated in a relevant environment. There is considerable variation in the time and effort 
required to apply the various methods, particularly in the different requirements for 
sample preparation associated with monitoring, including pre-concentration.  
 
The following AEMC microbial monitoring technologies can currently detect at the 
following levels: 
 
• Deep UV: 1000 molecules of tyrosine at 3 cm. Should convert to single cell in field 
of view. The capability to speciate is in development. 
• Terbium spore detection: 10,000 spores/ml converts to 50 spores/liter of air using 
existing hardware. 
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 • ATP-based microbial detection ~50 cells. 
• AMP-base spore detection about 100 spores. 
• LPS-based microbial detection 10 pg endotoxin ~ 30 cells. 
• DNA-based microbial detection 10 to 100 cells. 
• Quantum Dot Lateral Flow Assay 100 cfu/100ml (cfu = colony forming units). 
 
AEMC is also funding research on the identification of microorganisms by ion mobility 
spectroscopy, but the work is considered too preliminary to report on its sensitivity. 
 
6.3.5   Contaminants and Pathways 
 
Task: Identify potential contaminants or effects related to monitoring and control 
hardware systems (if any). 
 
It is first noted that the monitoring technologies themselves can be a source of 
contamination. For example, using culture-based approaches obviously amplifies the 
quantity of living matter which then represents a contamination threat. A much smaller 
threat would come from another technology termed BBICS (Bioluminescent Bioreported 
Integrated Circuits), which consists of small biochips which contain stabilized 
microorganisms that have been altered to emit light in the presence of certain chemicals.  
 
The group also recognized that ALS and AEVA equipment are also potential sources, for 
example biofilms, or a microbial water processor. 
 
The group believes it is necessary to understand the baseline microbial ecosystem due to 
the presence of humans. This baseline will be present wherever humans go—inside the 
habitat, outside, within spacesuits and in their vicinity, and similarly with rovers. 
Detecting a signal in the presence of this possibly substantial baseline may be a 
challenging signal to noise problem. Performing the tests necessary to establish the 
baseline will require considerable funding as well as appropriate facilities, some of which 
may not yet exist.  
 
6.3.6   R&TD Needs 
 
Task: Identify topics that require further research and technology development and 
discuss development strategies with uncertain PP requirements. 
 
The group recognized the following areas as needing further development: 
 
• Characterization of extravehicular effluents/leaks. This is necessary to establish a 
baseline understanding of what is released using current technology. The releases 
may be composed of inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals, intact cells, and cell 
fragments. The release composition is expected to vary according to the source, 
which may be EVA suits, habitats, rovers, ISRU, etc. The quantity and composition 
of the leakage will help refine issues regarding prevention—how much of the leak 
can be practically attenuated and associated mitigation. 
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• Characterization of internal environment: habitat, hardware, air, water, etc. What 
biocomposition is currently found in the internal environment? Is there a correlation 
to what is leaked, or are there significant differences? 
 
• Sampling/analysis techniques for all the above. 
– Internal (e.g.,surfaces, air, water, suit fabric inside and out) 
– External (e.g., surfaces (rocks), atmosphere, soil, effluents/leaks, rover, etc.) 
 
• Sensor network technology encompassing potential leak sources inside and outside. 
 
• Probable biological targets in martian environment. This effort would look at what 
types of organisms would be likely to exist and survive in the martian environment, 
based on terrestrial studies. The results would suggest focusing efforts on likely 
organism types, rather than on the ones which would have no chance of surviving. 
 
• Remediation processes for events; verification of remediation. What methods might 
be used to clean up an event? Small events might be handled by basically a towel, and 
some chemicals. Would it then be necessary to verify that the remediation was 
successful?  
 
6.3.7   Major Obstacles 
 
Task: Identify PP requirements that impose the greatest mission/development costs. 
 
The group identified a number of areas which appear to present imposing challenges. 
 
• Event detection - If it is necessary to detect events such as a sudden significant leak 
from habitat or suit, the necessary infrastructure to support such detection could be 
considerable. The group envisioned a large sensor network in landing vicinity. 
 
• Back contamination - What is the nature of the potential biohazard from Mars? The 
answer would seem necessary in order to define a monitoring system for detection of 
potential contamination and validation for safe return. The challenge is very large due 
to level of uncertainty in the understanding of Mars biohazards. 
 
• Remediation technologies - These are methods which would allow for recovery from 
a contamination release event. 
– Known options are high cost (e.g., using disposables) and only partially effective. 
 e.g., On Mir, Russians used a peroxide quaternary ammonium fungistat wipe. 
The wipe was not effective on fungus growth in fabric material on walls. 
– Need to consider both forward and backward contamination. Backward 
contamination is subject to the uncertainties noted above. 
– Need to consider internal/external environments. 
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  Events which release material to the outside may be able to take advantage of 
forced exposure to harsh martian environment for reducing forward 
contamination. 
 Mitigation technologies which work well inside the habitat may not be practical 
outside, and vice versa. 
– Small releases may be handled very differently than large releases, although the 
composition may be similar. 
– Quarantine may play a role – there is a need to consider AEMC’s role and 
requirements during the quarantine of the crew. 
 
6.3.8   Planetary Protection Requirements Definition 
 
Task: Identify PP requirements/topics that require further definition. 
 
The area of greatest uncertainty is clearly the requirement for backward contamination. In 
addition to this area, the group recognized the following requirements areas as needing 
further definition: 
 
• Detection/control response time required for AEMC activities/operations  
– Impacts mission operations, mitigation effectiveness 
• Commonality and differences between AEMC/PP/Science/Medicine 
– E.g., all may need bacterial sensors, but have different bacterial targets 
• PP requirements for human mission 
– Will human missions have same exposed surface requirement as robotic 
missions? (e.g., Will individual specifications for rovers, habitats, suits, tools, 
ISRU, etc. be required?) 
– What is the allowable discharge from the suit, airlock, habitat, rover, etc.? 
 
6.3.9   R&TD Rationale 
 
Task: State major findings and assumptions about PP considerations, as you understood 
them, that will impact your R&TD rationale. 
 
The group recognized that PP currently targets culturable spores only. However, the 
group also recognized that other targets such as non-culturable spores and cell fragments, 
could conceivably become PP requirement targets. 
 
6.3.10   Critical Open Issues 
 
Task: Identify critical open issues/uncertainties relative to PP that affect your R&TD 
(unknowns). 
 
• The AEMC, Medical, PP, and Life Detection Science communities all have 
overlapping needs and methods, and these must be coordinated through regular 
communication. 
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 – It will be important to clarify who owns the responsibility for monitoring to PP 
requirements? AEMC, PP, Science, all three? 
• Again it is noted that the back contamination targets/levels are unknown. 
• The quantity of biomaterial carried by any crewed mission exceeds the typical current 
PP requirement by many orders of magnitude. The impact of this situation needs to be 
understood. 
 
6.3.11   Planetary Protection Requirements Effect on R&TD  
 
Task: Describe the changes to your R&TD program that you believe will be necessary 
when PP requirements are defined/flowed: 
 
As noted above, the potential impact of PP requirements on monitoring needs can be 
considerable (in terms of infrastructure) and the current understanding has much 
uncertainty. It is plausible that the definition of PP requirements will indicate that many 
years of preparation are necessary to develop the needed monitoring and mitigation 
approaches. Depending on the extent of PP requirements, there may be considerable 
impacts on schedule and budget as well.  
 
6.4   REPORT OF PLANETARY PROTECTION (PP) SPECIALIZED 
BREAKOUT GROUP  
 
6.4.1   Participants of Specialized Breakout Group – Planetary Protection   
 
Lead: Margaret Race  
 
Group Members: 
Carlton Allen                                                        Max Coleman 
Judy Allton                                                           John Rummel 
Jack Barengoltz                                                    Perry Stabekis 
Karen Buxbaum                                                   Laurent Sibille 
Paul Campbell 
 
6.4.2   Group Charge 
 
The PP Specialized Breakout Group differed from the others in that a primary function of 
deliberations was to devise a preliminary approach that is capable of guiding ALS, 
AEVA and AEMC programs regarding system development in relation to PP regulations, 
as well as provide a framework that establishes a method for subsequent requirements 
development. The PP Group was charged with addressing the following topics: 
 
• Preliminary recommendations for forward contamination guidelines for human 
missions to Mars 
– Provide an estimate of the contamination allocable to a single human surface 
mission (e.g., total microbes released, total biosignature quantity released, size of 
contaminated area, etc.). 
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 – State assumptions/issues related to this estimate. 
• Formulate back contamination guidelines for human missions to Mars 
– Provide an estimate of the allowable probability of Mars organisms reaching 
Earth (contained in or on a spacecraft) for the return of crew and samples from a 
single human surface mission. 
– State assumptions/issues related to this estimate. 
  
Specific areas included in the charge: 
 
• Define an approach to address PP Policy development 
• Identify the knowledge necessary to establish PP guidelines with respect to ALS and 
AEVA systems 
• Identify monitoring needs for verification of PP policy compliance 
• Identify research needs 
• Identify PP requirements/topics that require further definition 
• Initiate drafts of top-level mission-specific (e.g., 1000 day Mars surface mission) PP 
policy guidelines, indicating level of certainty and potential future modifications 
• Identify and prioritize the most significant threats to PP 
• Overall recommendations 
 
6.4.3   Background Information and Starting Assumptions 
 
Current planetary protection requirements address both forward and back contamination 
with an emphasis on robotic missions, whether one-way or round-trip with sample return.  
The specific planetary protection requirements for human missions to Mars have not yet 
been developed and will need further consideration.  To date, all deliberations about 
human missions to Mars have built on lessons learned from the Apollo experiences as 
well as the findings and recommendations from a limited number of workshops and 
studies on planetary protection that relate  in varying degrees to human issues (e.g., NRC 
1992, 1997, 2002a, 2002b; Race et al., 2003).  This sub-group likewise built upon this 
same information during deliberations.   
 
At this time, it is impossible to provide quantitative PP guidelines for mission planners 
and designers because planetary protection requirements are likely to evolve in the 
coming years and decades in response to many factors (e.g., rapid changes in scientific 
information about Mars, advances in technology, improvements in methodologies for 
assaying cleanliness and reducing bioburden, further advice from the Space Studies 
Board, revisions in COSPAR PP policies, etc.).  Thus, a conceptual approach will be 
useful in guiding early discussions about AEVA, ALS, AEMC and other aspects of 
human missions.   In developing a conceptual approach that simultaneously addresses 
planetary protection concerns and considers the science exploration associated with 
human missions, the subgroup acknowledged that: 
 
•   Missions carrying humans to Mars will contaminate the planet.  It is therefore critical 
that every attempt be made to obtain evidence of past and/or present life on Mars well 
before these missions occur. 
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 • The complex capabilities that human explorers can contribute to the astrobiological 
exploration of Mars will be realized only if human-associated contamination is 
controlled and understood. 
•   Human crew members exploring Mars will inevitably be exposed to martian 
materials.  To the maximum extent practicable, these exposures should occur under 
controlled conditions. 
•  Safeguarding the Earth from potential back contamination is the highest planetary 
protection priority in Mars exploration. 
 
6.4.4   Overview of Preliminary Deliberations 
 
The group developed a tentative conceptual approach consistent with current planetary 
protection requirements and scientific concerns as follows: 
 
• Human missions to Mars shall not affect or otherwise contaminate “special regions”   
of Mars3, as defined in the COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy of October 2002. 
– Mission (orbiter, lander, rovers, crew, instruments, and tools) cleanliness 
requirements shall be determined in such a way as to avoid the inadvertent 
introduction of Earth organisms or organic molecules into these environments 
– Landing site selection and operational accessibility to scientifically desirable 
special regions (including prime access by ISRU activities to important 
subsurface ice or water ) shall be directly traded against the microbial or organic 
cleanliness of human-associated (or robotic) systems supporting the missions. 
 
• Calculations based on this approach will determine the tolerable levels of 
contamination allowed for specific aspects of any particular human mission. Specific 
details of the approach are TBD, but will involve working closely with the scientific 
community to integrate changing information about the martian environment and 
conditions,4 and to evaluate unavoidable levels of human-associated contaminants 
and their implications as biosignatures that may interfere with scientific investigations 
and/or the martian environment.  
 
In addition, the sub-group identified the following special issues that relate to the 
integration of PP concerns throughout mission planning and operations:  
 
1. The first human mission to Mars will face significant levels of risk during the various 
components of the mission.  Planetary protection risks must be among the many risks 
                                                 
3 A “Special Region” is defined as a region within which terrestrial organisms are likely to propagate, OR a region 
which is interpreted to have a high potential for the existence of extant martian life forms.  Given current 
understanding, this is applied to regions where liquid water is present or may occur. Specific examples include, but are 
not limited to:  subsurface access in an area and to a depth where the presence of liquid water is probable; penetrations 
into the polar caps; or areas of hydrothermal activity.  Note: In considering operational uses of this definition, special 
regions may include both horizontal and vertical dimensions. 
4 For example, as a starting point, it may be possible to develop an approach that focuses first on the strictest 
contaminant standards for special regions based on data about the lower limits of detection of sparse life on Earth.  
Presumably allowable contaminant levels would be less stringent for operations in and around the landing zone or in 
areas verified as zones of minimum biological risk. 
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 to be identified and evaluated together - then reduced, mitigated, or eliminated when 
possible to enable mission success.  Close and early coordination is essential among 
the diverse groups of specialists working on the many phases of mission 
development. 
 
2. General human factors need to be considered along with planetary protection issues 
for a human mission to Mars.  Physical effects that may lead to debilitation and 
reduced performance in astronauts could also lead to unintended actions, and in turn, 
to mishaps with potentially serious planetary protection consequences.  Mistakes are 
much more likely when people are tired, ill, and/or stressed or overly stressed 
 
3. Planetary protection is intimately linked with crew health and safety as well as overall 
mission success; it must be made a priority and not dismissed or eliminated in any 
mission phase.  A crewmember onboard the mission should be given primary 
responsibility for the implementation of planetary protection provisions affecting the 
crew during the mission.  In addition, PP information must be emphasized in the 
development of flight operations plans and medical oversight throughout the mission.  
 
6.4.5   Specific Recommendations 
 
a. Related to Forward Contamination 
 
1.  Human mission planning, including landing site selection, base location, and mission 
objectives, should follow from precursor robotic information and evaluations made at 
those sites and from information developed from a sample return mission or missions. 
 
2.  Definition is needed for a classification system describing and categorizing martian 
sites of special scientific interest and their level of contamination concern. The 
classification system shall be developed and employed in future planetary protection 
protocols, as well as in operational plans for later human missions to Mars. 
 
3.  It will not be possible for all human-associated processes and mission operations to be 
conducted within entirely closed systems. The potential for the long-term 
consequences of human-associated contamination and the possible interaction of 
contaminants and environments on Mars require further study.  
 
4.  Additional development and design attention are needed to characterize exploration, 
sampling, and base activities both to assure effective operation and provide the 
required level of planetary protection assurance.  
 
• Based on current technologies for robotic missions, controlled, aseptic, subsurface     
sampling operations will require additional emphasis. 
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 • Other areas needing special attention are: Ingress/egress, suit and EVA designs.5
 
5. Quantitative requirements shall be derived based on protection of special regions, 
except as follows: 
 
•  No quantitative bioburden requirements should be applied to landing systems or 
habitats, other than cleanroom assembly (currently Class 100,000, ISO Class 8)6
• Spacecraft, habitats and rovers shall filter material vented as gases (non-
condensable), and shall not allow disposal of uncontained solids or fluids.  
•  Steps shall be taken to mitigate contamination associated with astronauts involved 
in EVA operations adjacent to special regions or involved in sampling them 
• Hardware elements involved with accessing special regions be subjected to a 
sterilizing process either on Earth or on Mars (similar to robotic approach) 
 
b. Related to Back Contamination 
 
1. All operations of an initial human mission to a new site on Mars shall include 
isolation of humans from directly contacting martian materials until initial testing 
(either precursor-mission or on-mission robotic testing) can provide a state-of-the-art 
verification of the landing site as a “zone of minimum biological risk” (provide for 
the informed consent of the crew). 
 
2. Exploration, sampling, and base activities should be accomplished in a manner to 
limit inadvertent exposure to the subsurface or to otherwise-untested areas of Mars.  
A means for allowing controlled access to those areas shall be provided (TBD). Other 
areas of concern related to inadvertent exposure include repair/maintenance 
technologies and operations, planning and oversight of activities related to flight and 
in situ operations. 
 
3. The site classification system and a biological plausibility map of the martian surface 
and subsurface, based on remote sensing data and on-mission testing, shall be 
employed during any mission to limit potential crew exposure to areas on Mars that 
might support martian life. (Figure 1 illustrates a possible conceptual approach for 
such a site classification system.) 
  
                                                 
5 This workshop focused primarily on PP needs related to the first human mission.  Other topics of 
relevance to PP were beyond the scope of this workshop, including impacts of large scale environmental 
disruption (e.g., building berms, digging trenches), fuel and food production technologies, international PP 
policy development, and pre-arrival construction and deployment of resources and technologies.  





























Figure 1. Example of a possible conceptual approach for a site classification system 
based on discussions at Pingree Park workshop on Human Missions (Race et al., 2003) 
 
4. A quarantine capability for both the entire crew and for individual crewmembers shall 
be provided during the mission, in case uncontrolled contact with a martian life-form 
occurs.  Basic tests of the medical condition of the crew and their potential response 
to pathogens or adventitious microbes shall be defined, provided, and employed 
regularly on the mission.  It is essential that medical oversight and quarantine 
planning be informed by planetary protection information and guidelines. 
 
5. A quarantine capability and appropriate medical testing shall be provided for the crew 
upon return to the Earth (or Moon or Earth-orbit) and implemented in conjunction 
with a health stabilization program.  
 
6. Samples returned by the crew from uncontrolled or otherwise-untested areas of Mars 
shall be considered as potentially hazardous, and shall not be released from 
containment until a series of tests determines that they do not present a biohazard.   
 
6.4.6   R&TD Needs 
 
1. Describe the potential impacts on the near-field martian environment of human 
support activities expected in the operation of a human-occupied martian base, e.g., 
breathing oxygen, food supply, waste management, etc., to determine the zone of 
contamination associated with a human landing, and the plausible limits of zones of 
no-contamination that can be preserved nearby. 
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 2. Define the spatial dispersion of dust and human-associated contaminants on Mars by 
wind and other means.  
 
3. Determine the survivability of a range of Earth organisms and their component 
molecules in the ambient Mars environment, and in the conditions of the martian 
near-subsurface. 
 
4.  Examine future ALS designs and concepts with respect to planetary protection needs, 
especially those related to organic and microbial contamination, to assess the 
potential effects of human activities in pressurized habitats and human-carrying 
rovers. 
 
5.  Examine future AEVA designs (thermal control, gas control, material leakage) with 
respect to planetary protection needs, especially with respect to organic and microbial 
contamination, to assess the potential effects of human activities on the martian 
surface away from pressurized habitats and human-carrying rovers. 
 
6. Develop AEMC technology required for life detection and potential pathogen 
detection, with a focus on sensitivity and specificity of tests needed to identify 
potential microbes of unknown origin. 
 
7. Determine how to conduct human-associated robotic operations on Mars to be 
consistent with planetary protection concerns, both those deployed independently 
during precursor missions and in conjunction with human landings during later 
missions. 
 
6.4.7   Conclusions 
 
Although there is an absence of explicit PP policies and requirements for human missions 
to Mars at present, it is possible to outline a conceptual approach and provide preliminary 
guidelines for planners and designers of AEVA, ALS, and AEMC activities.  Refinement 
of the approach and development of more specific guidelines will likely occur over time 
in response to information from R&TD activities coupled with findings from the many 
precursor robotic missions outlined in the Exploration Roadmap (see Figure 2).  PP 
requirements for human missions will undoubtedly be very different than those used 
during Apollo missions.  Clearly, early and regular coordination between the PP, 
scientific, planning, engineering, operations and medical communities is needed to 
develop workable and effective designs for human operations on Mars.  Coordination 
will bring numerous mutual advantages to the various programs such as identifying 
common needs for new technologies (e.g., among planetary science exploration, human 
mission operations, and PP).  Finally, long duration operations on the Moon may provide 
a relevant test-bed for many mission technologies.  Mission planners must address PP 
technology on the Moon in ways that feed forward to martian exploration, even though 
the actual PP levels required on the Moon are considerably less stringent than those for 
Mars. Current concerns about biological potential and life detection on Mars suggest that 
technologies and operations related to planetary protection are likely to need special 
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 attention.  In planning the long term design and operations strategies, it will be important 
to avoid going down two distinct and expensive technology pathways—one for the Moon 
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Figure 2:  Exploration PP Roadmap showing potential linkages and 
schedules for development of Mars human mission PP requirements based 
on Mars robotic precursor missions, future lunar missions, and Mars 
focused activities. 
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 APPENDIX A – ACRONYM LIST 
 
AEMC – Advanced Environmental Monitoring and Control 
AEVA – Advanced Extravehicular Activity 
ALS – Advanced Life Support 
CEV – Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CFU – Colony Forming Unit: a measure of microbial growth in lab assays 
CO2 – Carbon Dioxide 
ELS – Exploration Life Support 
EMU – Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
ESMD – Exploration Systems Mission Directorate  
ET – Extraterrestrial 
EVA – Extravehicular Activity  
HACCP - Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point  
ISRU – In-Situ Resource Utilization 
JPL – Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
LSH – Life Support and Habitation 
MEPAG - Mars Exploration Program Assessment Group 
PLSS – Portable Life Support System 
PP – Planetary Protection 
PSIA – Pounds per Square Inch Absolute 
SCCM - Standard Cubic Centimeter per Minute 
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8:30 – 9:10   Advanced Life Support – Dr. Daniel  J. Barta  
  9:10 – 9:50   Advanced Extravehicular Activity – Dr. Lara Kearney 
  9:50 – 10:30   Advanced Environmental Monitoring and Control – Dr. Darrell Jan  
 10:30 – 10:45   Break 
 10:45 – 11:25   Planetary Protection Policy and its Development – Dr. John D. Rummel 
 11:25 – 12:00 Planetary Protection Implementation on Robotic Missions – Dr. Karen 
Buxbaum  
12:00 – 1:00  Lunch 
 1:00 – 1:40 Planetary Protection and Humans on Mars – Report of the First 
Workshop – Dr. Margaret Race 
 1:40 – 1:50 Charge to groups  - Assignment to initial breakout groups (2) 
 1:50 – 3:00 Begin general breakout groups – Identification of overall issues 
   3:00 – 3:15   Break 
  3:15 – 4:30   Continue Breakout Group Discussions   
  4:30 – 5:00   Presentation Preparation  
  5:00  End of Day 
 
Thursday, April 28, 2005  
 8:00 – 9:00 Initial general presentations and discussion – Groups 1 & 2 
9:00 -10:30 Specialized breakout groups begin  
10:30 – 10:45 Break 
10:45 – 12:00 Specialized breakout groups continue 
12:00 - 1:00 Lunch 
  1:00 - 3:00 Specialized breakout groups continue 
  3:00 - 3:15 Break  
  3:15 - 5:30 Specialized breakout groups continue   
  5:30   End of Day 
 
Friday, April 29, 2005  
8:00 - 9:30  Specialized Breakout Groups prepare final presentations 
 9:30 - 9:50  ALS Group presentation 
 9:50 - 10:10  AEVA Group presentation 
10:10 – 10:30  AEMC Group presentation  
10:30 – 10:45  Break 
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10:45 – 11:15 Planetary Protection Group presentation 
11:15 – 11:45 Group Discussion – Identification of future needs 
11:45 – 12:00  Conclusions 
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